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TRAMMEL v. UNITED STATES- BAD
HISTORY, BAD POLICY, AND BAD LAW
Michael W. Mullane*
[W]e think it time to acknowledge what is now... compel-
lingly clear: the case was a mistake. We do not lightly recon-
sider a precedent, but, because [it] contradicted an "unbroken
line of decisions," contained "less than accurate" historical
analysis, and has produced "confusion," we do so here.1
In 1980 the United States Supreme Court decided Trammel v.
United States? The opinion changed the Spouses' Testimonial Privi-
lege, overturning centuries of consistent case decisions. The Court
based its decision on the history and effect of privilege3 and a straw
poll of state legislative and court decisions on the issue.4 The Court
concluded its decision would permit the admission of more spousal
testimony without impairing the benefits the privilege was supposed
to confer on spouses. The Court's decision in Trammel was wrong
on three counts. The first was bad history overlaid with questiona-
ble analysis. The survey of the state's treatment of the privilege was
done in recognition of the longstanding federal tradition of ab-
staining from the regulation of marriage and family matters in favor
of the states' regulation. Today, the United States Congress and Ex-
ecutive Branch view marital and family issues as legitimate areas for
federal regulation and control. The Court's conclusion that the
change mandated by its decision would preserve the underlying goal
of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege simply ignored the reality of
the modem criminal justice system. Finally, it appears the Court's
decision was based on a view of the family's future that has been
overtaken by subsequent events.
All evidentiary privileges are based upon the recognition of social
values extending beyond the Court's desire to have access to all
available evidence when deciding a case. Privileges are granted only
where the costs and benefits entailed in obtaining and using the evi-
dence are outweighed by the benefits and costs to some other social
value. Absent from the Supreme Court's analysis was any meaning-
ful attempt at balancing the need for evidence against the social
* Professor of Law and Director of Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, University of
Maine School of Law;, B.A., 1964, Notre Dame University; J.D. 1972, Notre Dame
Law School.
1. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849,2864 (1993) (quoting Soloria v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 439, 442,450 (1987)) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508
(1990)) (footnote omitted).
2. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
3. 'Tammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44, 52 (1980).
4. Id at 48-50.
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costs of obtaining the evidence. The Trammel decision was seriously
flawed when written. Its premise has been rendered moot by subse-
quent political developments. The case is ripe for reconsideration
and reversal.
The Trammel decision decreed a single change to the Spouses'
Testimonial Privilege, one of two evidentiary privileges protecting
the marital relationship. 5 The other evidentiary privilege protecting
the marital relationship is the Marital Communications Privilege. 6
The confines of the Marital Communications Privilege are
easy to describe. First, the privilege extends only to words or
acts intended as communication to the other spouse .... Sec-
ond, it covers only those communications made during a valid
marriage... unless the couple had irreconcilably separated
S.... Third, the privilege applies only to those marital commu-
nications which are confidential. That is, the privilege does
not extend to statements which are made before, or likely to
be overheard by, third parties .... Marital communications
are presumptively confidential .... 7
The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is not confined to confidential
communications. It precludes compelling a witness to give testi-
mony adverse to his or her spouse, regardless of the subject matter,
source, or time when the information was gathered. Thus the Mari-
tal Communications Privilege resembles the Attorney-Client, Doc-
tor-Patient, and other privileges concerned only with protecting the
confidentiality of communications within certain relationships. The
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is analogous to the Privilege against
Self-Incrimination.
Until Trammel, either spouse could assert the Spouses' Testimo-
nial Privilege. Unlike the Marital Communications Privilege, how-
ever, the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege does not survive the end of
the marriage.8
The two marital privileges differ in both application and scope.
The Marital Communications Privilege applies to any testimony
about private communications between spouses, whether or not its
revelation might be adverse to either spouse. Furthermore, secrets
5. The Advisory Committee's Note to proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505
identities two Spouses' Testimonial Privileges: one privilege for the party spouse
and another for the witness spouse. Most commentators and courts, however, see
this as a single privilege jointly held by both spouses. See generally IV 8 Wto~IoRE
ON EVIDENCE §§ 2227-2245 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The Supreme Court in Tram-
mel spoke of modifying a singular privilege, as opposed to eliminating one of two
privileges. "'ammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-53 (1980).
6. The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege and the Marital Communications Privilege
are also known by other names, but these designations shall be used throughout this
article.
7. United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted).
8. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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told a spouse during a marriage remain protected even after the
marriage has ended?9
The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is different on both counts.
This privilege applies only to testimony adverse to the non-witness
spouse and is available only during the marriage. On the other
hand, the protection of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is not lim-
ited to confidential communication. It protects all adverse testi-
mony, regardless of the source of the witness's knowledge.10
The following chart may prove useful.
Attribute Spouses Testimonial Marital
Privilege* Communications
Privilege
Requires valid Yes Yes
marriage
Scope Covers all Covers only
testimony adverse testimony about
to the witness' confidential
spouse communications
Waivable by Both spouses only* Either spouse-
Matters Covered Not Covered
occurring before
marriage
Privilege survives No Yes
the marriage I I
* At common law, before Trammel
** Some jurisdictions vest the privilege only in the spouse who
made the confidential statement.
I. WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE Is Us11
The decision in Trammel marked a shift in the Supreme Court's
perception of the societal value of marriage and family on the one
9. See, e.g., United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977) (Marital
Communications Privilege may be asserted by the non-witness spouse even after the
marriage has ended). But see United States v. Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th
Cir. 1988) (The Marital Communications Privilege does not cover communications
made after the spouses had irretrievably separated).
10. The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege applies only to testimony, not to non-tes-
timonial evidence. Appropriately, courts look to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to determine what is and what is not testimony protected by the privilege. See,
ag., In re Shelleda, 666 F. Supp. 196 (D. Colo. 1987) (Fingerprints and handwriting
exemplars are not protected because they are not communications). See also Note,
Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,1570
(1985).
11. Pogo by Walt Kelly.
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hand and the need for judicial access to "every man's evidence" on
the other.1
2
Prior to Trammel, the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege prevented
anyone from testifying against his or her spouse, if they or their
spouse objected. Traditionally, the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege
differed from all other privileges in that it was held by two people,
either of whom could assert it. Like all privileges, it could be
waived, but only if both spouses agreed.'3 The privilege has existed
in this form virtually since the beginning of recorded common law.
The decision in Trammel stripped the privilege from the hands of
the party spouse. In effect the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege be-
came the Spouse's Testimonial Privilege. Henceforward, only the
witness spouse held the privilege. The practical effect of the deci-
sion on Mr. and Mrs. Trammel, as well as those who came after, was
dramatic. The case sanctioned attempts by the government to in-
duce, if not coerce, the defendant's spouse to testify against her or
him. This change rewrote an ancient social contract, striking a new
balance between the social importance of law enforcement and the
family.
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Trammel was to
declare open season on spouses. Law enforcement has been busy
exploiting its new license ever since Trammel. The extent and suc-
cess of federal law enforcement's attempts to turn wives and hus-
bands against each other is difficult to assess. Still, the tip of the
iceberg bobs to the surface often enough to cause concern about the
mass lurking below the reported opinions. 4 The impact of Trammel
cuts even deeper into the social fabric. It established a judicial tone
12. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 50 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
13. Id at 46 (citing Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74,78 (1958) and Wyatt v.
United States, 362 U.S. 525, 528 (1960)).
14. The Author has been unable to locate any source of statistics or categoriza-
tion listing cases in which one spouse testifies against another. Since Trammel there
have been understandably few reported objections to the appearance of a spouse as
the government's witness. Such cases can be found, however. !&g., United States v.
LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1991) (former wife testifies against ex-hus-
band pursuant to agreement with government; it is unclear when the divorce oc-
curred); United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 698-99 (2nd Cir. 1990) (wife had "a
cooperation agreement with the government under which she agreed to testify
[against her husband] in exchange for immunity"); United States v. Neal, 532 F.
Supp. 942, 944 (D. Colo. 1982), aff'd, 743 F2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984) (wife cooper-
ated with F.B.I. as immunized government witness by permitting them to tape-rec-
ord telephone conversations with husband where she asked questions suggested by
government and provided subsequent testimony at husband's trial).
Another variant of the ploy is revealed by the Fourth Circuit's unpublished opin-
ion in United States v. Hernandez, 912 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1990), where the govern-
ment induced a guilty plea by promising not to prosecute the defendant's wife.
Other examples exist. See also Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834,838 (4th Cir. 1992);
Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244, 1245 (11th Cir. 1985).
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that effectively precluded development and recognition of a privi-
lege protecting the parent-child relationship."5 Today, law enforce-
There is a significant number of cases denying assertions of the marital privileges
on grounds of the "joint participation" exception, holding that the privileges cannot
be asserted if the witness was also a participant in the crime. The Tenth Circuit
decision in United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978), was based
upon recognition of this exception as a necessary modification to Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). The Seventh Circuit previously acknowledged the excep-
tion in United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974). Notwithstanding
the Supreme Court's failure to follow this lead in deciding Trammel, the exception
has been recognized by several other circuits. Given the broad scope of the law on
accessories and co-conspirators, and the assumed privacy and intimacy of most mar-
riages, this approach has proven productive for law enforcement. See United States
v. Walton, No. 91-5064, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24945 (6th Cir. 1991) (subject to
Sixth Circuit Rule 24 limitations on citation as authority); United States v. Marashl,
913 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983) (assertion of Spouses' Testimo-
nial Privilege denied on multiple grounds); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238
(3rd Cir. 1983) (involving communications as part of continuing criminal activity and
acknowledging joint participation exception); United States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d
597 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming on other grounds the district court's application of the
Joint Participation Exception). It is fair to assume that once the marital privilege
has been denied on this ground a defendant spouse might be willing to reconsider
any plea or other offers held out by government in exchange for his or her coopera-
tion. See also United States v. Kane, 944 F.2d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1991) (wife re-
fused offer of immunity to testify against husband, was called by government
knowing she would not inculpate husband, and then impeached with a prior incon-
sistent statement). But see In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276 (3rd Cir. 1980) (refusing to
recognize the exception).
On at least one occasion the post-Trammel Spouses' Testimonial Privilege enabled
a witness to provide protection for his spouse. See In re Matthews, 714 F.2d 223 (2d
Cir. 1983) (government grants wife immunity to induce husband's agreement to tes-
tify against in-laws). For a less effective instance of post-Trammel protection of a
marriage, see In re Ford, 756 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1985) (government avoids privilege
by promising to use husband's testimony only against targets other than his wife and
to create a "Chinese wall" around his testimony in subsequent investigation and
prosecution of his wife).
15. United States v. Harris, No. 87-5840, 1988 WL 74154 (6th Cir. July 19, 1988).
(refusing to recognize a parent/child privilege, citing Trammel; subject to Sixth Cir-
cuit Rule 24 limitations on citation as authority); In re John Doe, 842 F.2d 244 (10th
Cir. 1988) (concerning a fifteen-year-old refusing to testify against his mother and
citing Trammel); United States v. Davies, 768 F2d 893 (7th Cir. 1985) (denial of
child/parent privilege, citing Trammel); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th
Cir. 1985) (son agrees to testify against father in exchange for immunity from prose-
cution for perjury before grand jury after assertion of child/parent privilege is de-
nied, citing Trammel); United States v. Smith, 742 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1984) (mother
has no privilege to refuse to testify against son, citing Trammel); United States v.
Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982) (rejecting a family privilege where witness was
emancipated minor, citing Trammel); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.
1980) (refusing to recognize a child/parent privilege where son, age five, was given
five dollars to show police where his mother hid heroin during a search of family
home, citing Trammel); Port v. Heard 594 F. Supp. 1212, 1220 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (de-
nial of family privilege asserted by father and step-mother subpoenaed to testify
against son at grand jury, citing Trammel). However, a family privilege providing
[Vol. 47:105
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ment appears to have few qualms about inducing children to inform
on their parents.
There is a girl named Crystal who lives Downeast in Searsport,
Maine. In 1992, she sat in her fifth grade classroom and listened to a
police officer explain the DARE program. 6 According to the Wall
Street Journal, "DARE police ... teach children about the dangers
of drugs [and] also befriend students on the playground and in ex-
tracurricular activities." One commentator has noted that "the ex-
perience of seeing a uniformed police officer as a loving, caring and
concerned human being has to make a tremendously positive im-
pression on the child."' 7 All DARE police instructors are trained to
encourage students to raise their hand if they know anyone who
uses drugs but not to mention any names. After the dangers of drug
use are explained to the children, they are encouraged to see the
officer after the program if there "is anything troubling them."' 8
Crystal listened. She was bothered by what the officer told her. She
knew her mom and dad smoked marijuana.
Several days later she was still worried. She decided to see if the
police officer could help her. She wanted her parents to stop but
had never been able to talk to them about it. According to Crystal,
the police officer promised "nothing would happen" to her parents
and asked her for more details.19 She told him about the plant in
her mother's closet.
The next day, [the police officer] and two state drug agents
interviewed Crystal for about an hour at school. That after-
protection for confidential communications between parents and children has been
recognized. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983). See J. Tyson Covey,
Making Form Follow Function: Considerations in Creating and Applying a Statutory
Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. IL. L. Rnv. 879, 882-86 (1990) for a brief history of
the attempts to develop a parent-child privilege.
Other examples of a clash between family values and government interests in-
clude: United States v. DiMichele, No. 88-00060, 1989 WL 104947 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5,
1989) (an unsuccessful attempt to force a convicted husband to testify against his
wife in a civil forfeiture action); United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1992)
(District Court refused to honor a wife's assertion of the Spouse's Testimonial Privi-
lege based on a finding of waiver by giving a voluntary statement to the police and
testimony at a pre-trial proceeding); In re Larson, 785 F2d 629 (8th Cir. 1986)
(targets are sisters of witness' wife, dismissed as moot).
16. DARE is an acronym for Drug Abuse Resistance Education. The program is
based on a model developed by the University of Southern California. In 1992,4700
communities participated, reaching almost one fourth of all the grade schools na-
tionally. The program is coordinated by DARE America, Inc., and works through
local police departments. Joseph Pereira, I Would Never Tell Again, WALL ST. J.
(Eastern Edition), Apr. 20, 1992, at Al.
17. WALL ST. J. (Eastern Edition), Apr. 20, 1992, at A7 (quoting Chris Ringwalt,
a DARE analyst for the Research Triangle Institute, a private social policy research
concern in North Carolina).
18. Id.
19. Id
1995]
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noon, two Searsport police officers and four drug agents con-
verged on [Crystal's] home .... Crystal's ... eight-year-old
sister was taken to a next-door neighbor. A few minutes later
... Crystal was placed in a police car as she got off the school
bus and was driven off by police.2 °
The full extent of DARE's success in convincing children to be-
come government informants is difficult to assess, but Crystal's story
is not unique.2 '
The Author is a child of the Cold War.22 For those of my genera-
tion, the Pogoesque impact of Mrs. Trammel and Crystal's exper-
iences is unavoidable. During the 1940s and 1950s, the antithetical
differences between the societal values of the Free World and the
totalitarian regimes of the Nazi Germany and post-war Communist
nations were a consistent subject of discussion, education, and prop-
aganda. These distinctions swirled around the West's commitment
to protection of individual political rights and privacy as opposed to
totalitarian insistence on the primacy of the state.
The Nazis and Communists were certainly blood enemies. Yet
they were united in their assertion of the government's right to con-
trol everything. They controlled what people were told. They con-
trolled what people could say. They actively attempted to control
what people thought. They did this by insisting it was every individ-
ual's duty to inform the government about everyone else-including
their own families. Husbands were pitted against wives, children
against parents and grandparents.
I still can remember, at age ten, trying to imagine how it would be
to live like that. As a child, I found the concept of children and
20. Id.
21. Police officers involved in DARE deny such windfalls are the "main purpose"
of the program. Id at Al. It is also clear that at least some participating officers
have had more than one experience with children informing on their parents. See
also United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (police officer paid a five-
year-old five dollars to show where his mother hid heroin during a search of the
family home, citing Trammel); James Bovard, Kids, Cops, and Caseworkers:
America's Newest Parent Traps. DARE Scare: Turning Children Into Informants,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 30, 1994, at C03; Mike Kaszuva, Critic's Question Antidrug Pro-
gram. Is DARE Saving Kids from Drugs or Teaching Glorified Snitch Tactics?, STAR
TRIuNE, June 7, 1992, at 01B; Joan Abrams, When a Lewiston Girl Turned In Her
Mon, Was It a Victory for Kids and a Campaign, Or An Unwarranted Attack on
ParentalAuthority?, LEWiSTO MORNING TRIBUNE, July 5, 1992, at 1A (eleven-year-
old girl who brought a bag of marijuana, drawings of paraphernalia, and a list of
reasons why she should and should not turn in her mother and gave them to DARE
officer "was perfectly willing to have her mom hauled off to jail," (according to
police officer)).
22. The Author's personal experience represents a broad, if unscientific, sampling
of primary education in the United States during the period. I entered first grade in
1948 and graduated from high school in 1960. My father was in the military. Be-
tween first and twelfth grades I attended ten schools in three states and the District
of Columbia. The schools were about evenly divided between public and parochial.
[Vol. 47:105
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parents sending one another to prison frightening. Even at age ten,
I had some sense of the isolation and vulnerability such a betrayal
would create. In the late 1970s Alexander Solzenitzyn's The Gulag
Archipelago23 was still able to call up the same visceral reaction.
Three years after the United States Supreme Court announced its
decision in Trammel, Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro published Son
of the Revolution.'4 The book is Liang Heng's account of growing
up in mainland China during the Cultural Revolution. His mother
held a responsible job with the Public Security Bureau. She offered
criticism of a supervisor as part of the Hundred Flowers Movement.
This program of intra-party criticism was followed by the Anti-
Rightist Movement. The Author speculates that the first program
was a giant testing operation designed to lure Rightists out into the
open. In any event, every work unit was given a quota of Rightists
to uncover. Heng's mother's name was included on her unit's list.
Heng describes the impact on his father.
Just as his wife was being declared an enemy of the Party, Fa-
ther was actively participating in the Anti-Rightist Movement
in his own unit. Father believed in the Party with his whole
heart, believed that the Party could never make a mistake or
hand down a wrong verdict. It was a tortuous dilemma; Fa-
ther's traditional Confucian sense of family obligation told
him to support Mother while his political allegiance told him
to condemn her. In the end, his commitment to the Party won
out, and he denounced her. He believed that was the only
course that could save the family from ruin3 s
Heng also tells about the day he read his older sister's "Thought
Reports" to the Communist Youth League. "She confessed her
weakness in going to see her Capitalist mother, and her determina-
tion to overcome such tendencies, saying she hated herself for their
past contact. She even said she wanted to renounce all family ties
and let the Party be her true father and mother ..... 26 Crystal
would understand.
The decision in Trammel was and is bad policy. The symbolic sig-
nificance of this change is more likely to have a profound impact on
our societal values than to produce any benefit from additional con-
victions. Today the stage is set for the Supreme Court to reexamine
the issue and reverse its unsuccessful experiment in futurism.
At the time of the Trammel decision, whether and in what form
the institutions of marriage and the family might survive were not
matters of federal concern. Such issues were left to the states. No
federal policy on marriage or the family existed. As a result, federal
23. ALEsADR L SoLzHENrsYN, THE GULAG ARcWmELAoo (1973).
24. LIANG HENG AND JuDrTH SHAPiRo, SON OF THE REVOLUTION (1983).
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id. at 38.
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courts had little guidance in assessing weight to be given the social
values of family and marriage. Consideration of the marital privi-
leges has long consisted of holding up a wetted judicial finger to
determine the direction of the popular breeze.' The Trammel opin-
ion was implicitly driven by the Court's view of two broad social
phenomena: The impact of the Sexual Revolution on the family and
marriage, and the War on Crime. The former has changed signifi-
cantly in the years since 1980. The latter was, perhaps, misplaced.
The Trammel opinion expressly acknowledged the absence of fed-
eral policy on family and marriage as an obstacle to evaluating the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege? 8 The fifteen years since the Tram-
mel decision have seen the emergence of an express federal policy
on families and marriages. The traditional federal abstention from
involvement in marriage and family issues has evaporated. A clear
federal policy and willingness to regulate both are emerging.29 On
27. "[T]he laws of marriage and domestic relations are concerns traditionally re-
served to the states." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 50. See also the Court's
survey of the States' treatment of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege. Id. at 48-50.
28. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 49-50 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 404 (1975)).
29. See, eg., Deborah Maranville, Welfare and Federalism, 36 Loy. L. Rav. 1
(1990) (review of abstract and pragmatic political components of the debate about
federal versus state and local control of welfare); Steven R. Smith, Disabled
Newborns and the Federal Child Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Protection, 37 HAS-
INGS L.J. 765 (1986) (federal child abuse statutes are probably ineffective in achiev-
ing the intended purpose of influencing decisions to withhold treatment of
newborns); Mary Ann Born, Baby Doe's New Guardians: Federal Policy Brings
Nontreatment Decisions Out of Hiding, 75 Ky. LJ. 659 (1986-87) (attempt to recon-
cile conflicting messages from Supreme Court and Congress embodied in court ad-
herence to tradition on federal non-intervention in parenting decisions as embodied
in Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) and the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (1982)); Faye R. Goldberg,
Child Support Enforcement: Balancing Increased Federal Involvement With Proce-
dural Due Process, 19 SutrouK U. L. Rv. 687 (1985) (noting the trend toward
increased federal participation in support enforcement and calling for more); Doug-
las B. Neagli & Matthew B. Troutman, Constitutional Implications of the Child Sup-
port Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 24 J. FAM. L. 301 (1985) (analyzing the
policy and regulatory impact of the act). The breadth and detail of federal regula-
tory intervention in family law matters can be glimpsed in the following statutes: 18
U.S.C.A. § 228 (West Supp. 1994) (criminalizing "Failure to pay legal child support
obligations"); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 280b-la (West Supp. 1994) ("Interpersonal violence
within families and among acquaintances"); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 280c-6 (West Supp.
1994) ("Projects to improve maternal, infant, and child health"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 602
(West 1991 & Supp. 1994) ("State plans for aid and services to needy families with
children; contents; approval by Secretary; records and reports; treatment of earned
income advances"); 42 U.S.C.A § 656 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) ("Support obliga-
tion as obligation to State; amount; discharge in bankruptcy"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 658
(West 1991) ("Incentive payments to States [based upon collections of past-due sup-
port]"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 659 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) ("Enforcement of individual's
legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments"); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 660 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) ("Civil action to enforce child support obligations;
jurisdiction of [United States] district courts"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 664 (West 1991 &
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May 1, 1991 the National Commission on Children published its fi-
nal report: Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children
and Families. The National Commission on Children was jointly es-
tablished by President Reagan and Congress in December of 1987.
Its mandate
was to assess the status of children and families in the United
States and propose new directions for policy and program de-
velopment. [The Commission's] mission was to design an ac-
tion agenda for the 1990s and to build the necessary public
commitment and sense of common purpose to see it
implemented?
The Commission's final report represents a major shift in the winds
of federal policy on family and marriage last tested by the Supreme
Court in Trammel.
The purpose of this Article is to re-examine the Trammel decision.
We shall examine the implied social assumptions and predictions
upon which the Court based its decision. We will also examine the
impact of this decision on efforts to extend evidentiary protections
to familial relationships beyond those of wives and husbands.
II. THi UNrTED STATES AND MRS. TRAMMEL V. MR. TRAMMEL
"Now I can no longer be required to testify against you in
any jurisdiction anywhere."
I stared thoughtfully at my bride .... "I am grateful that
you do not want to testify against me. But I am not sure that
Supp. 1994) ("Collection of past-due support from Federal tax refunds"); 42
U.S.C.A. § 654 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) ("State plan for child and spousal sup-
port"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) ("Requirement of statutorily
prescribed procedures to improve effectiveness of child support enforcement"); 42
U.S.C.A. § 667 (West 1991) ("State guideline for child support awards"); 42
U.S.C.A. § 669 (West 1991) ("Collection and reporting of child support enforcement
data"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994) ("National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102 (West Supp. 1994) ("Advisory Board on
Child Abuse and Neglect"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (West Supp. 1994) ("Inter-Agency
Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5104 (West Supp. 1994)
("National clearinghouse for information relating to child abuse"); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5105 (West Supp. 1994) ("Research and assistance activities of the National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a (West Supp. 1994) ("Grants to
States for child abuse and neglect prevention and treatment programs"); 42
U.S.C.A. § 5106c (West Supp. 1994) ("Grants to States for programs relating to the
investigation and prosecution of child abuse and neglect cases"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5116
et seq. (West Supp. 1994) ("Community-based family resource programs"); 42
U.S.C.A. § 10407 (West Supp. 1994) ("Information and technical assistance centers
[for family violence]"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 10410 (West Supp. 1994) ("Grants for state
domestic violence coalitions"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 10413 (West Supp. 1994) ("Family
member abuse information and documentation project"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 10415 (West
Supp. 1994) ("Model State leadership grants for domestic violence intervention").
30. NATIONAL COMMSSION ON CHI.DRE , BEYOND RHmEroRic A NEw Abwnm.
CAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAmmIs viii (1991).
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the legal principle you cited can be applied in this
jurisdiction."
"But that's a general rule of justice, Richard. A wife can't
be forced to testify against her husband. Everyone knows
that. 31
Robert Heinlein's protagonists hold this conversation in the year
2188. They have just been married in one of several extraterrestrial
habitats then occupied by humans.
A. Prelude: Common Law Privileges
and the Federal Rules of Evidence
The two marital privileges had a long run, remaining undisturbed
for three centuries. In 1933, the Supreme Court in Funk v. United
States,32 abrogated the rule of spousal incompetency. Prior to Funk,
spouses of parties were deemed incompetent to testify. This rule
was derived from the rule, although the latter had already been
abandoned, that all parties were incompetent to testify.33 The ruling
in Funk left the Spouses' Testimonial and Marital Communications
Privilege undisturbed.34 In 1958, the Court expressly reaffirmed the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege in Hawkins v. United States.35
Mr. Hawkins, a resident of Arkansas, was accompanied on a trip
to Oklahoma by a woman other than his wife. While in Oklahoma
he was arrested and charged with interstate prostitution in violation
of the Mann Act.36 Mr. Hawkins claimed he was engaged in an hon-
est business trip. The woman's presence was "only an accommoda-
tion .... ." The woman testified that Mr. Hawkins "agreed to take
her to Tulsa where she could earn money by working as a prostitute
.... Mr. Hawkins' wife appeared at trial, ready, willing, and,
since Funk, able to testify for the prosecution. The trial court per-
mitted Mrs. Hawkins to testify, notwithstanding her husband's as-
sertion of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege. Mr. Hawkins was
convicted.
In Hawkins v. United States,38 the Supreme Court distinguished
between the rule of spousal incompetency abandoned in Funk and
31. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE CAT WHO WALKS THROUGH WALLS 27-29 (G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1985).
32. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
33. The incompetency of the party spouse was imputed to the non-party spouse,
based upon the legal presumption that spouses had an identity of interests, at least
as against third persons.
34. For a discussion of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege and the Role of
Spousal Incompetency, see infra notes 68-100 and accompanying text.
35. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988) (original version at ch. 645, 62 Stat. 812 (1948)). See
also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 74-79.
37. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 80.
38. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege. The former was no longer justi-
fied since the parties were themselves deemed competent.39 The
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege, however, was based upon a different
justification, a justification still viable in the mid-Twentieth Century.
While the rule forbidding testimony of one spouse for the
other was supported by reasons which time and changing legal
practices had undermined, we are not prepared to say the
same about the rule barring testimony of one spouse against
the other. The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife
against husband or husband against wife in a trial where life or
liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy was necessary
to foster family peace .... 40
The benefits of familial peace extended beyond the family. The
public policy was also based upon the belief that intact families pro-
vided benefits to the public as well.
The Court concluded: "Such a belief has never been unreasona-
ble and it is not now.""1 The government argued that the wife's
willingness to testify indicated there was no marriage worth saving.
The Court disagreed. The Court remarked that anger passes and
some marriages survive deeply troubled times. "[T]here is still a
widespread belief, grounded on present conditions, that the law
should not force or encourage testimony which might alienate hus-
band and wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences." '4
Barely seven years later the Court launched the marital privileges
onto perilous waters. In 1965, Chief Justice Warren appointed an
Advisory Committee to draft rules of evidence. The Committee's
conceptual approach to reform was antithetical to all evidentiary
privileges. The Advisory Committee wished to expand admissibility
to encompass all relevant information. Whenever possible, privi-
leges would be eliminated. If this was not possible, they would be
pared to the bone in scope and applicability.43
In October of 1970, the Judicial Conference approved a Revised
Draft of the Proposed Rules. The Revised Draft included a pro-
posed revision and codification of all common law evidentiary privi-
leges based on this approach. The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege
was preserved, the Marital Communications Privilege was elimi-
nated.4 The Supreme Court published the Revised Draft, seeking
final comment before promulgation. "[O]rganized opposition sur-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. I1&
42. Id. at 79. The Marital Communications Privilege had been recognized by the
Supreme Court in Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934), and again in Blau v.
United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
43. 2 JAcK B. WEnNsrEN & MARGARET A. BURGER, WVnumsTmN's EviDENCE,
501[01] (1991).
44. Proposed FED. 1K Evm. 505, 51 F.R.D. 315, 369, provided:
1995]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
faced, notably from the United States Justice Department. Con-
servative members of Congress were also upset ... ,,4 Opposition
to the proposed rules focused on the Court's treatment of
privilege.46
The Supreme Court approved the revised rules in November,
1972 and sent them to Congress as required by the Rules Enabling
Act.
The committee hearings, floor debates, and resulting disparity be-
tween the House and Senate bills presented the conference commit-
tee with a formidable challenge. The dispute over the continued
existence and scope of the marital privileges was particularly in-
tense. Enactment of the rules was delayed for two years. 7 For a
time it appeared the dispute over the Marital Privileges might cause
Congress to reject the entire set of rules."8 Congress, unable to re-
solve the dispute within its own ranks, finally gave up. When en-
acted by Congress in 1975, the evidentiary privileges were excluded
from the Federal Rules of Evidence. The privileges remained in the
domain of the common law."9 Privileges would remain the last bas-
tion of the federal common law of evidence.
RULE 505. HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGE.
(a) General rule of privilege.
An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to prevent his spouse
from testifying against him.
(b) Who may claim privilege.
The privilege may be claimed by the person or by the spouse on his be-
half. The authority of the spouse to do so is presumed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
Subsection (c) of the proposed rule provided for certain exceptions in cases involv-
ing crimes against the spouse or children of either. The proposed rule was based on
Uniform Rule of Evidence 504 (1953). This formulation differed from the tradi-
tional rule only in that it vested the privilege in only the party spouse rather than in
both. The Uniform Rule was amended in 1986 to conform to the decision in
Trammel
45. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NiNEIEs 25 (3rd Ed. 1991).
46. WEINSTEIN, supra note 43, 505[01].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. FED. R. EvID. 501 reads:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be deter-
mined in accordance with State law.
The Enabling Act was also amended. The new version provided Congress more
time to react to proposed changes in the Rules of Evidence. More specifically, the
new act provided: "Any... rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary
[Vol. 47:105
TRAMMEL v. UNITED STATES
The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege survived intact. Hawkins was
still the law of the land.
B. Whose Reason? What Experience?
A Lever in Search of a Fulcrum
Five years after the Federal Rules of Evidence became law the
Supreme Court exercised its reason and experience upon the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege in Trammel.
Mr. Trammel and two others were charged with importation and
conspiracy to import heroin. Their smuggling activities involved six
other unindicted co-conspirators, including Mr. Trammel's wife,
Elizabeth. Mr. and Mrs. Trammel successfully smuggled heroin into
the United States on a trip from the Philippines to California in Au-
gust 1975. Later, Mrs. Trammel went back to the Far East, without
her husband, for more heroin. The heroin was discovered this time,
during a customs search on her return to the United States. Eliza-
beth Trammel agreed to testify against her husband."0
At her husband's trial, "Mrs. Trammel was called as a Govern-
ment witness under a grant of use immunity .... She explained that
her cooperation with the Government was based on assurances that
she would be given lenient treatment.""1 Elizabeth Trammel had
not been prosecuted for her role in the conspiracy.s2 Mr. Trammel,
relying on Hawkins, objected to his wife's testifying against him.
His objection was overruled by the trial court. Mrs. Trammel testi-
fied for the government. Mr. Trammel was convicted and appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit
found "a compelling need to alter or amend the common law rule
enunciated in Hawkins ... . Mrs. Trammel's complicity as a co-
conspirator required an exception to the Spouses' Testimonial
Privilege.
privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by [an] Act of Congress." 28
U.S.C. 2074(b) (1988). These changes only prevented judicial modification or abro-
gation of privileges by exercise of its rule-making power. Rule 501 did not prevent
further interpretation by the Court in deciding specific cases. T-rammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
The British recently had the opposite experience, with equally unsatisfactory re-
sults. Parliament undertook to rewrite and enact its own reform of the Spouses'
Testimonial Privilege. Peter Creighton, Spouse Competence and Compellabilty 1990
ChmM. L. REv. 34,35. For additional discussion on the practical problems of compel-
ling the reluctant spouse to testify in England and Vales, with comparisons to simi-
lar problems in Australia, Canada, and the United States, see Susan Edwards,
Compelling a Reluctant Spouse, 139 NEw LJ. 691 (1989).
50. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 42.
51. Id. at 43 n2.
52. Id. at 42, 43.
53. Trammel v. United States, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1978); aff'd 445 U.S.
40 (1980).
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In our view the allegiance reaffirmed in Hawkins... to the
marital testimonial privilege grounded on the policy of pre-
serving or fostering family peace must give ground to a
greater, more compelling public need before us here. This
case, unlike Hawkins and other cases, involves the wife as a
participant in the criminal transaction, subject to prosecution
therefor.54
The Tenth Circuit in Trammel quoted with approval from the Sev-
enth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Van Drunen: The "goal of
preserving families [did] not justify assuring a criminal that he can
enlist the aide of his spouse in a criminal enteTrise without fear that
... he is creating another potential witness."' 5
The United States Supreme Court chose another path. It held
that Mr. Trammel was correct. Undef Hawkins and the common
law, Mr. Trammel could prevent his wife's testimony by assertion of
the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege. But the Supreme Court Justices
did what the judges of the Tenth Circuit could not: they overruled
Hawkins.56 Beginning with the testimony of Elizabeth Trammel, the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege was held only by the witness spouse.
The following is a summary of the Supreme Court's analysis and
decision. While the Court felt it should be cautious in changing the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege because it has a long history,57 it nev-
ertheless noted that the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is a vestigial
remnant of an abandoned legal theory and ancient sexist legalisms
that are no longer acceptable to our society.58 The Court ap-
proached the privilege cautiously because "marriage, home and
family relationships [are] already subject to much erosion in our
day."'59 Noting that modem apologists for the privilege argue that it
fosters the "harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship,"
60
the Court, however, viewed this justification to be wrong. If one is
willing to testify against their spouse, said the Court, there is "little"
54. 1d at 1168.
55. Id. at 1169-70 (quoting United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396-97
(7th Cir. 1974)). The Tenth Circuit limited its decision to the facts before it, holding
only that "a defendant husband cannot prevail upon his claim of the marital privi-
lege when his wife gives incriminating testimony under grant of immunity." I& at
1169. The court indicated, however, that it was open to further extensions of the
exception such as those previously recognized by the Eighth Circuit in United States
v. Smith, 520 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1975) (admitting statements of a co-conspirator
spouse made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy) and the Sev-
enth Circuit in United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974) (rejecting
the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege in cases where both spouses are involved as ac-
complices or co-conspirators).
56. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 43, 53.
57. Id. at 43-48.
58. Id. at 43-44, 52.
59. I& at 48.
60. Id at 44.
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marital harmony remaining to be preserved.61 Thus, in the Court's
view the common law Spouses' Testimonial Privilege disrupts mar-
riages by allowing one spouse to stay out of prison by testifying
against the other.61 The Court noted that modem critics see the
privilege as "an indefensible obstruction to truth."63 The Court
pointed out that family law matters are traditionally concerns of the
states, not the federal government and that a growing number of
states have limited or abolished the Spouses' Testimonial Privi-
lege.' 4 It further noted that confidential communications are privi-
leged.6 The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege, in the Court's view,
permits everyone to convert their home into a den of thieves; it
gives every married person "one safe and unquestionable and ever
ready accomplice for every imaginable crime."66 Changing the priv-
ilege will not encourage the government to "pit one spouse against
the other," because the government can do this under the existing
law.67 The Court found that vesting the Spouses' Testimonial Privi-
lege in only the witness-spouse furthers "marital harmony without
unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs."' t
The Court's arguments fall into two categories. First, there are
the historical attacks. The Court concluded the privilege was in-
tended to protect Medieval sexual roles that have been abandoned.
We shall consider these aspects of the Trammel decision in the fol-
lowing section. The second category of issues raised by the Court
involves an assessment of the importance of marriage and the family
versus the need for evidence in contemporary society. These argu-
ments are discussed in Section IV below.
Im. MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
ORiGiNs OF THE SPousEs' TESTIMONIAL PRIVIEGE
In this Section, we shall address three questions. First, is the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege an anachronistic relic of the long
abandoned rule of Spousal Incompetency? Second, is it intrinsically
gender biased? Third, why have two marital privileges?
61. Id. at 52-53.
62. Id.
63. Id at 45 (citing 8 JoiiN HENRY WmMOpE, EvmENCE § 2228, at 221 (1961)).
64. Id. at 48-50.
65. Id. at 51.
66. Id. at 52 (quoting 5 . Bm -ai, RATnONALE OF JUDICIAL EvmENcE, at 338
(1827)).
67. Id. at 52 n.12.
68. Id at 53.
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A. The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege and
the Rule of Spousal Incompetency
Early English courts held that a party was always incompetent to
testify as a witness. The rule was based upon the judgment that the
parties' interest in the outcome made it probable that any testimony
they might give would be unreliable. From this premise, a corollary
rule of Spousal Incompetency developed. The incompetency of all
parties was extended to their spouses, as married couples were pre-
sumed to share an identity of interests.69
The common law rule held that the spouses of all parties were
incompetent to testify. Because they were incompetent, they could
not be called by either party. Theoretically at least, the court would
not permit a spouse of either party to testify, even if neither ob-
jected. As explained above, the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege
could be asserted by either spouse to prevent one from being com-
pelled to testify against the other.
The Court in Trammel saw the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege as a
surviving vestige of the rule of Spousal Incompetency, which was
abandoned in Funk.70 This characterization was a mistake, one not
made by the Court in Hawkins.7 It is unclear whether this mistake
was the cause of, or was caused by, the decision to overrule
Hawkins.
In Trammel, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The privilege claimed by [Mr. Trammel] has ancient roots.
Writing in 1628, Lord Coke observed that "it hath beene re-
solved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either
against or for her husband."... This spousal disqualification
sprang from two canons of medieval jurisprudence: first, the
rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in his own
behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the
concept that husband and wife were one, and that since the
woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the hus-
band was that one. From those two now long-abandoned doc-
trines, it followed that what was inadmissible from the lips of
the defendant-husband was also inadmissible from his wife.
Despite its medieval origins, this rule of spousal disqualifica-
tion remained intact in most common-law jurisdictions well
into the 19th century .... [I]t was deemed so well established
[by the Supreme Court] as to "hardly requirfe] mention." In-
deed it was not until 1933, in Funk v. United States... that this
69. In this Article, the disqualification of a party's spouse shall be referred to as
the rule of Spousal Incompetency. There was no inequity in preventing testimony in
civil claims of one spouse against the other. Since both were parties, neither could
testify. In this respect, spouses were treated the same as all other litigants.
70. Trammnel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 44 (citing Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. 371 (1933)).
71. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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Court abolished the testimonial disqualification in the federal
courts, so as to permit the spouse of a defendant to testify in
the defendant's behalf. Funk, however, left undisturbed the
rule that either spouse could prevent the other from giving ad-
verse testimony... The rule thus evolved into one of privi-
lege rather than one of absolute disqualification. 7
Chief Justice Burger returned to this theme later in the opinion.
The ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have
long since disappeared. Nowhere in the common-law world-
indeed in any modem society-is a woman regarded as chattel
or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dig-
nity associated with recognition as a whole human being."a
Chip by chip, over the years those archaic notions have been
cast aside so that "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for
the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for
the marketplace and the world of ideas."74
In short, the Trammel Court found the Spouses' Testimonial Privi-
lege the vestigial remnant of the rule of Spousal Incompetency,
which was already an anachronism when finally abandoned a half-
century earlier in Funk. However, the Spouses' Testimonial Privi-
lege did not derive from the rules of party and spousal disqualifica-
tion. As noted above, the Court did not make this mistake in
Hawkins v. United States.75 Justice Black expressly distinguished be-
tween the policies supporting the rule of Spousal Incompetency and
the Spouses' Marital Privilege.76 Furthermore, Justice Black wrote
the Hawkins opinion in 1958. If the Court's rhetoric in Trammel is
to be taken at face value, one must assume that only after that date
did a majority of the United States Supreme Court cease to regard
women as mere chattels, admit women had a legal identity in-
72. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 43-44 (citations omitted).
73. The accuracy of this statement is questionable. It is literally true only if un-
derstood as an attempt to define as "archaic" any societies adhering to a cultural
view that does not include a presumption of sexual equality. Clearly there are con-
temporary societies that are modem by most criteria other than equality in legal
status and public roles of men and women.
74. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 52 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)). There is some suggestion that the medieval courts accorded
wives somewhat more recognition than is suggested by the Court in Trammel:
In Henry II's reign [1547-89] ... [t]he attorneys ... are by no means
always professional men of business. Probably every free and lawful man
may act as the attorney of another, indeed, shocking as this may seem to us,
we may, not very infrequently, find a wife appearing in court as her hus-
band's attorney.
FREnERc W. MArra.NaD & FRANas C. MoNTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGusH LEGAL
HrsroRY 95 (AMS Press 1978) (1915).
75. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
76. Id.
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dependent of their husbands, and otherwise begin to recognize wo-
men as "whole human beings.""
The Court's confusion of the historical basis of the Spouses' Testi-
monial Privilege is of more than scholarly interest. Rules of compe-
tency and privilege are supported by very different policy goals. As
we shall see, whatever its value today, the Spouses' Testimonial
Privilege never looked to the rule of Spousal Incompetency for
justification.
1. The Rule of Spousal Incompetency
The distinctions between competency and privilege appear fairly
straightforward. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger was not the first
to confuse the two when dealing with the party/spousal rule of in-
competency and the marital privileges.78
"Competency" is a threshold measure of a witness' ability to pro-
vide reliable testimony. The degree of reliability required to accept
a witness as competent has changed over the centuries. The under-
lying concept, however, has remained constant. It has always been
the duty of the trial judge to prevent incompetent witnesses from
testifying.79 On the other hand, common law courts have always
permitted the testimony of all competent witnesses having informa-
tion relevant to a material issue of fact. Indeed, the common law
courts have a long tradition of compelling such testimony. Wit-
nesses who are capable of providing reliable testimony will be
heard. Those who are not, will not. In this sense, competency is the
first rule of evidence. The exclusion of incompetent witnesses is
consistent with the underlying goal of the trial process: the determi-
nation of truth. This goal is furthered by consideration of reliable
evidence. Consideration of unreliable evidence leads to unreliable
decisions.
77. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Trammel comes close to making the
same point. Justice Stewart dissented from the majority in Hawkins: "I thought [the
Government's] arguments were valid then, and I think so now." Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. at 54 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice
Stewart expressly agrees with the Chief Justice's assertion that the foundations for
the privilege have been swept away; he thought they were long gone in 1958. Id.
78. E.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1951) (Minton, J., dissent-
ing) (failing to distinguish privilege from competency); The King v. Cliviger, 100
Eng. Rep. 143, 146 (1788) (acknowledging the problem). Even Justice Black in
Hawkins initially referred to Spousal Incompetency and the Spouses' Testimonial
Privilege as two phases of the same rule, the only distinction being admission of
favorable testimony. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 76 (1958). As noted
above, however, he drew a clear distinction between the basis for each "phase."
79. For a survey of the tests of competency currently incorporated in the evi-
dence rules adopted by a variety of states, see 1 GEORGE P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG ET AL,., EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RuLEs IN THE STATES
ch. 35 (1990).
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The rule of Spousal Incompetency was an adjunct to the underly-
ing disqualification of all parties. At least as early as the second half
of the seventeenth century, the English courts held that all parties
were incompetent to testify as witnesses.80 The rule was based upon
the parties' interest in the outcome. It was assumed their interest
would make their testimony unreliable. This rule became part of
the American common law. In 1810 Samuel Bayard noted that
"[o]ur books are filled with cases of characters who are disqualified
from being witnesses, on account of the interest or very strong bias
they are supposed necessarily to have, which in the contemplation of
law, precludes the probability of their adhering strictly and impar-
tially to the truth."'
The ancient common law concept of competency varies from the
modem concept embodied in the rules of evidence only in the de-
gree of unreliability that will be tolerated. Initially, it was assumed
that justice was best served by eliminating all testimony that might
be distorted by interest. Our ancestors apparently had more faith in
the jury's ability to infer the truth from limited evidence than in its
ability to detect falsehood and error.8s
The same presumption of unreliability was extended to anyone
with an interest in the outcome. The incompetency of a party was
shared by his or her spouse, because the spouse was presumed to
80. See Scott Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IOWA L Rnv. 482 (1939)
for a discussion of competency under the common law. Rowley suggests that the
concept is universal to all legal systems. He finds the common law approach to
competency as noteworthy only for the relatively few individuals excluded as wit-
nesses. Id. at 490.
81. SAMuEL BAYARD, A DIGEST OF AmERICAN CASES ON THE LAW OF EVI-
DENCE 111-12 (1810). See also Bensen v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892).
82. This approach is sensible when viewed in the context of a system using a
panel of knowledgeable but disinterested individuals as the fact-finding jury. The
original evidentiary witnesses were people whose connections to the case or parties
precluded their sitting as impartial jurors, but which were not so close as to preclude
them from giving evidence. 1 E. CoKE, A Co EmrrARm UPON LnmEON 6b
(1628) (1832 ed.) C'[O]ften times a man may be challenged to be of a Jury, than
cannot be challenged to be of a Witnesse; and therefore though the witnesse be of
the nearest alliance, or kindred ... to either party... shall not exclude the witnesse
to be swome.").
Modem research into the ability of judges and lay persons to detect error through
body language suggests this approach may have more merit than is generally sup-
posed. Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AhmswcAN
PsYCHOLoGrm'r 913 (1991).
Today, the jury trial is based on opposite presumptions. We assiduously keep any-
one with knowledge of the case or parties off the jury panel. We also assume that
justice is better served by letting these ignorant finders of fact hear all available
information, even that from sources which may be unreliable. We rely upon them to
distinguish truth from falsehood, and to winnow out the effects of interest, bias, and
prejudice.
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share the party's interest in the outcome.83 The marital relationship
was important because of its effect upon the spouse's reliability. As
a matter of law, husband and wife were presumed to constitute a
legal unity. It was this legal unity of interest that caused the courts
to attribute the incompetency of the party to her or his spouse.
The rule of Spousal Incompetency was not entirely a result of the
legal fiction of a marital unity of interests. Courts also acknowl-
edged that the personal bond between spouses created personal in-
fluences beyond any identity of legal interest. The courts realized
that the emotional aspects of marital relationships could affect the
spouse's testimonial reliability in unpredictable ways. If the emo-
tional bond had been broken or become antagonistic, the spouse
might be motivated to injure the spouse, whatever their shared in-
terests. It did not matter if the testimony would favor or hurt the
cause of the party spouse.' 4 Whether the marital relationship re-
sulted in a desire to help or an emotional motive to injure, the result
was the same. The party's spouse could not be counted on to give
reliable testimony. Therefore, the witness was incompetent and
would not be heard.
The historical sexist presumptions imbedded in the view that mar-
riage created a legal unity are undeniable. The right and power to
bind and loose the marital entity was vested in the husband. The
limitations upon that power were few.85 This meant that the hus-
band was generally the party and the wife the witness. Nevertheless,
the theory of spousal incompetency was gender neutral in concept:
both spouses were incompetent. It did not matter which was the
party and which the witness.'
During the nineteenth century, views about competency began to
change on this side of the Atlantic. In 1864, Congress enacted a
statute providing that parties in civil cases were competent as wit-
nesses. 8 A similar statute providing that defendants in federal
criminal cases were competent to testify in their own defense was
83. COKE, supra note 82, at 6b (one cannot be called to testify for or against his
or her spouse).
84. E.g., Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 221, 13 Pet. 207, 220 (1839).
85. 1 WILLIAM BLAcKsTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (the wife's legal existence is
"suspended or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband"
during the term of the marriage). See also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF
DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 7.1 (1968).
86. BLAcKSroNE, supra note 85, at *431. For early United States cases sug-
gesting a sexist bias by courts in determining competency on other grounds, see
Michael W. Mullane, The Truthsayer and The Court: Expert Testimony on Credibl.
ity, 43 ME. L. REv. 53, 95 n.165 (1991).
87. Professor James F. Colby reports that: "The first statute of this kind in
America, admitting testimony of all persons on equal terms, leaving it for the triers
to give it... such weight as it may deserve, was enacted in Connecticut in 1848. This
statute appears to have influenced [the British] Parliament in passing a similar mea-
sure ... in 1851." MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 74, at 169 n.1.
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passed in 1 87 8.88 States also began to abandon rules of party incom-
petency during the second half of the last century. The abandon-
ment of party and spousal incompetency had nothing to do with
social concerns over sexual roles or the stability of marriages. The
change was prompted by a greater trust in juries' ability to deter-
mine credibility issues.
The federal rule of Spousal Incompetency, however, survived well
into the twentieth century. As previously noted, the Supreme Court
finally abolished the rule in Funk v. United States, decided in 1933.
[S]ince defendants were uniformly allowed to testify in their
own behalf, there was no longer a good reason to prevent
them from using their spouses as witnesses. With the original
reason for barring favorable testimony of spouses gone the
Court concluded that this aspect of the rule should go too. 9
The essential point is that the rules of party and spousal disqualifi-
cation were based upon considerations of evidentiary reliability.
Neither sought to preserve the marital relationship.
2. The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege
As already noted, the common law developed two distinct rules of
evidentiary privilege based on the marital relationship the Spouses'
Testimonial and Marital Communications Privileges.' The primary
distinction between matters of competency and privilege rests in the
concept of compeilability. That is the distinction between a witness
who may be heard and the power to compel a witness to testify.
Incompetent witnesses will not be allowed to testify-even if
neither party objects.91 On the other hand, all competent witnesses
may testify. But, not all competent witnesses can be compelled to
testify.
Competent witnesses holding an evidentiary privilege may not be
compelled to testify about matters protected by the privilege. The
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is no different in this respect than any
other evidentiary privilege.
The Trammel decision suggests that the Spouses' Testimonial
Privilege evolved only as a replacement for the Rule of Spousal In-
88. Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892).
89. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 76 (explaining its earlier decision in
Funk v. United States).
90. The Advisory Committee's Note to proposed Rule 505 suggested there were
two privileges against testimony against a party by his or her spouse: one for the
party spouse, and another for the witness spouse. ibis approach was also taken by
the Court in Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 526-28 (1960). Most commenta-
tors and courts, however, see this as a single privilege jointly held by both spouses.
91. Admittedly, this is not always the result. Absent objection by someone, the
court may be unaware of the witness's incompetency. However, once aware that a
witness is incompetent, the court must prevent her or him from testifying.
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competency when it was abandoned during the last century.92 In
fact, however, the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege, had been recog-
nized by the common law for over three centuries. Both privileges
existed side by side with the rules of Party and Spousal Incompe-
tency for several centuries. Indeed, Dean Wigmore states that the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege predates the rule of Spousal Incom-
petency. The first known reference to the rule of Spousal Incompe-
tency is found in Lord Coke's Commentarie upon Littleton written in
1628. 3 Dean Wigmore cites references to the Spouses' Testimonial
Privilege that predate this reference by a half century.94 By 1623,
five years before Lord Coke's remark, Parliament found it necessary
to create a statutory exception to the privilege in bankruptcy
cases. 5 Indeed, the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege not only pre-
dates the rule of Spousal Incompetency, it appears to predate even
the privilege against self-incrimination.9 6
92. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 44.
93. The Supreme Court in Trammel mistakenly cites this reference as a source of
the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 43-44.
Lord Coke, however, clearly was speaking about the rule of Spousal Incompetency.
Lord Coke first lists various grounds of incompetency including sanity, youth, "or a
partie interested." He then adds: "[I]t hath beene resolved by the Justices that a
wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband, quia sunt duae anlmae in
came una .... Spousal testimony for as well as against a party is barred. 1 E.
COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LrrTLETON 6b (1628). The reference, therefore,
must be to a rule of incompetency barring all testimony. The Spouses' Testimonial
Privilege only bars testimony against the party spouse. Unfortunately, Lord Coke
saw fit to add a reference to the preexisting Spouses' Testimonial Privilege when he
added: "[A]nd it might be the cause of implacable discord and dissention betweene
the husband and wife .... Id. Coke's coupling in the same sentence both privilege
and disqualification may offer a partial explanation of the tendency to equate the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege with the rule of Spousal Incompetency.
94. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961), citing 1 Bent v. Al-
lot, Cary 135, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
95. Id.
96. See id §§ 2227, 2333. The Marital Communications Privilege is even older.
Id It is not surprising to discover that the earliest evidentiary privilege acknowl-
edged by the common law was that shielding the attorney/client relationship. See
Note, Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. Rnv.
1450, 1456 (1985) (citing Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1577) and Dennis v.
Codrington, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (1580)). All three of the evidentiary rules arising out of
the marital relationship predate the accused's privilege against self-incrimination.
The privilege against self-incrimination was not generally accepted before 1641 and
the decision in Lilburn's case. 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637-45). It was only after
Lilburn that:
[W]ith a rush, the Courts of Star Chamber and of High Commission are
abolished, and the "ex officio" oath to answer criminal charges is swept
away with them. With all this stir and emotion, a decided effect is pro-
duced and is immediately communicated.., to the common law courts ....
It begins to be claimed, flatly, that no man is bound to incriminate himself
on any charge (no matter how properly instituted) or in any court not
merely in the ecclesiastical or Star Chamber tribunals). Then this claim
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The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege cannot be a vestigial remnant
of the rule of Spousal Incompetency. For this to be true, we would
have to accept the logically absurd proposition that the effect pre-
ceded the cause.
Nevertheless, the frequency with which parties and witnesses had
recourse to the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege must have decreased
after acceptance of the rule of Spousal Incompetency. Testimony
damaging to the spouse of the witness is most likely to arise when
the spouse is a party. After acceptance of the rule of Spousal In-
competency, there was no need to assert the privilege in such cases.
A competency objection would prevent the witness from taking the
stand altogether.
The privilege was not entirely moot, however. The rule of privi-
lege was available and necessary for non-party witnesses. Non-party
witnesses might be asked questions that could "criminate" their
non-party wife or husband. Through the centuries the justification
of the marital privileges was always protection of the family and
marriage, not a presumed unreliability of the spouse witness.
An example can be found in The King v. Cliviger.Y The sole dis-
puted factual issue in the case was the validity of James' marriage to
Margery. There was evidence that James previously married Ellen.
Ellen was still living when James and Margery married. Neither
James, Margery, nor Ellen was a party to the suit." At trial, the
defense called Ellen. She was permitted, over objection, to testify
that she and James had been married and that their marriage pre-
ceded that of James to Margery. Plaintiff lost and appealed. The
sole issue on appeal was whether or not it was error to admit Ellen's
testimony. There was no question of Ellen's being disqualified as
incompetent. She was neither a party nor the spouse of a party.
Nor did Ellen or James have any legal interest in the outcome of the
suit.99 Ellen was a competent witness, but was her testimony in vio-
lation of a privilege held by James?
[I]n all the books which treat evidence... certain... rules laid
down... relate to husband and wife; and we find the general
rule as to them to be founded, not on the ground of interest,
but of policy; by which it is established that a wife shall not be
comes to be conceded by the judges-first in criminal trials... and after-
wards ... in civil cases though not without ambiguity and hesitation.
8 WVIGMORE, supra note 93, § 2250 (footnote omitted).
97. 2 Term. 263, 100 Eng. Rep. 143 (1788).
98. The law suit was for "settlement," Le, to determine the residency of paupers.
Residency established the local community's obligation of support. It also might
give rise to a right to recover for support provided. 2 Term. 263, 267-68, 100 Eng.
Rep. 143, 146 (1788) (Ashurst, J., opinion).
99. Id. ("It has been long established, that the question of settlement raises no
interest in the parties whose settlement is in dispute, therefore, I lay all considera-
tion of interest out of the case.").
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called to give testimony in any degree to criminate her hus-
band .... [S]he shall not be called even indirectly to criminatehim.'00
Nevertheless, the rule of Spousal Incompetency certainly reduced
the number of cases in which the marital privileges might be in-
voked. The opposite was also true. When the rules of Party and
Spousal Incompetency began to be abandoned during the last cen-
tury, the number of cases in which a party might need to assert the
marital privileges increased .'0  The essential point, however, re-
mains: competency and privilege address separate issues. The
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is based upon a balancing of the need
for evidence against the need to encourage and preserve stable fam-
ilies, not a presumption that the protected testimony was inherently
unreliable.
B. Is the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege
the Result of Historical Gender Biases?
Chief Justice Burger suggested the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege
was the vestige of a legal cause abandoned by the Court in 1933. He
is wrong. So are his suggestions that the rule's justification is depen-
dent upon the predominant sexual roles of medieval England.
There is no doubt such archetypal roles existed and are unaccept-
able in contemporary American society. The Court's error lies in
the assumption that such sexual stereotypes were the basis of the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege. As discussed above, whatever the
gender-bias presumptions inherent in the rule of Spousal Incompe-
tence, they never formed the theoretical justification of the Spouses'
Testimonial Privilege. The privilege has always been equally appli-
cable and available to wives and husbands. As early as 1684 Lord
Jeffrey gave the rule a gender neutral formulation: "[A] husband
cannot be a witness against his wife, nor a wife against her husband,
to charge them with anything criminal, except only in cases of high
treason. This is so known a common law rule that I thought it could
not have borne any questions or debate.'1°2
Nor was the privilege intended as a disguised ploy to protect hus-
bands from responsibility for crime committed upon their wives.
The privilege did not apply where one spouse was charged with a
100. The King v. Cliviger, 2 T.R. 268-69, 100 Eng. Rep. 146 (1788) (Grose, J.,
opinion). This case and portions of the same passage were quoted in Stein v. Bow-
man, 10 L.Ed. (13 Pet.) 129, 135 (1839).
101. The same phenomenon occurred with the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The privilege was established in 1641. However, until 1878 the accused was
barred from the stand in federal courts by the rule of Party Incompetency. Thus for
almost 250 years, it was unnecessary to invoke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion at trial.
102. Lady Ivy's Trial, 10 How. St. T. 557, 644 (1684).
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crime against the other. This exception was recognized from an
early date. 03
There is no doubt that gender bias in favor of men and against
women was a predominant theme in our culture throughout the de-
velopment of the common law. Contemporary American society is
marked by a strong movement towards achieving cultural, social,
and economic equality for women. It is also true that gender-based
stereotypes still are held by many in our society, and that gender-
based discrimination continues to exist. It is hardly surprising that
such discrimination is often found within marriage and family. Nev-
ertheless, there is no inherent sexual bias in the desire to protect or
the protection afforded the marital relationship by the privilege.
The need for trust and loyalty in the relationship is not dependent
upon how the partners see their personal roles within the family. 104
The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is supported by a number of so-
cietal and personal values. They include: (1) the social importance
of marriage and the family; (2) the individual spouses' rights of pri-
vacy and their expectation of shared privacy; and (3) the necessity of
trust and loyalty to close interpersonal relationships. The last is not
the result of de jure identity of interest based upon "medieval ca-
nons of jurisprudence,"' 5 nor does it flow from any social or legal
failure to recognize the individuality of either spouse.
Discarding the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege because it was cre-
ated during a time when society sanctioned gender bias makes no
more sense than arguing that the United States Constitution and
Bill of Rights should be abandoned because they were written and
interpreted so as to sanction slavery and racial discrimination.
C. Why Have Two Marital Privileges?
Compared to the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege, courts have
shown little tendency to confuse the policies supporting the Marital
Communications Privilege with those underlying the rule of Spousal
Incompetency. Nor has there been much confusion of the two mari-
tal privileges. 0 6 The year after abandoning the rule of Spousal In-
103. Lord Audley's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 401,402 (1631). (The wife was permitted
to testify as the victim of a rape instigated by her husband. The exception was nec-
essary, "otherwise she might be abused.").
104. But see Kelly, Sister Love: An Exploration of the Need for Homosexual Ex-
perience, CONFRONTING THE ISSUES: SEx ROLES, MARRIAGE, AND THE FA.WLY 70
(Kammeyer ed. 1975) (Reprinted from 21 TiE FAutmy CooRDINATOW: JOURNAL
OF EDUCATION, COUNSELING AND SERVICES (Oct. 1972)) (suggesting the institution
of marriage is irretrievably sexist).
105. "iamrmel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 43.
106. It does happen, however. For an example of a court and counsel apparently
confusing the federal Spouses' Testimonial and the Marital Communications Privi-
leges, see Walker v. Lewis, 127 F.R.D. 466, (W.D.N.C. 1989) (determining, due to
the perceived disparity between the inability of the non-witness, party spouse to
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competency in Funk, the Court expressly reaffirmed the Marital
Communications Privilege in United States v. Wolfie. °17 In Wolfle
the Supreme Court recognized the Marital Communications Privi-
lege as being distinct from both the old rules of Party and Spousal
Incompetency and the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege.
The basis of the immunity given to communications be-
tween husband and wife is the protection of marital confi-
dences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the
marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the
administration of justice which the privilege entails ....
Hence it is that the privilege with respect to communications
extends to the testimony of husband or wife even though the
different privilege, excluding the testimony of one against the
other, is not involved ....
Communications between the spouses, privately made, are
generally assumed to have been intended to be confidential,
and hence they are privileged; but wherever a communication,
because of its nature or the circumstances under which it was
made, was obviously not intended to be confidential it is not a
privileged communication .... And, when made in the pres-
ence of a third party, such communications are usually re-
garded as not privileged because not made in confidence
108
As noted above, the Spouses' Testimonial and Marital Communi-
cations Privileges differ in both scope and application. But why
have two marital privileges? The answer is that each is intended to
accomplish a different goal. Both reflect the high societal value
placed on marriage and the family, yet each seeks to foster and pro-
tect a distinct aspect of marriage. Indeed, the Marital Communica-
tions Privilege can be understood as intended to foster stable
marriages. The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege, on the other hand, is
intended to protect existing marriages from destructive interven-
tions by the state.
The need for communication between spouses has long been rec-
ognized as a prerequisite for a successful and lasting relationship.
The primary purpose of the Marital Communication Privilege is to
foster stable marriages by assuring the privacy of marital communi-
cations. The possibility that such communications might be made
public would cause a chilling pall upon all marriages. This same
proposition applies to all other evidentiary privileges intended to
protect the privacy of communications. Like those other privileges,
assert the privilege under Trammel, whether a state statutory version of the Marital
Communications Privilege or the federal Spouses' Testimonial Privilege was control-
ling during discovery of federal claims and pendant state claims).
107. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
108. Id. at 14-15. The Marital Communications Privilege was again affirmed by
the Court in Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
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the Marital Communications Privilege fits nicely within Dean Wig-
more's oft-quoted criteria for defining such privileges.1°9
The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is not intended to foster confi-
dential communications within the marriage. The Spouses' Testimo-
nial Privilege prevents one spouse from being the instrument of
harm to the other. It is intended to protect the marriage from direct
assaults upon the marital relationship by strangers to the marriage,
including the state and courts. Beyond the benefit realized from
minimizing the risk to the marriage in question, the privilege also
stands as a broad affirmation of the high societal value placed on
marriage and family.
Clearly, the benefits provided by the marital privileges overlap.
The Marital Communications Privilege also serves to protect mar-
riages from a destructive betrayal of trust. Similarly, the Spouses'
Testimonial Privilege also has the effect of nurturing marriages by
fostering a sense of shared privacy between spouses." 0
The Court in Trammel also found the scope of the Spouses' Testi-
monial Privilege unique among the evidentiary privileges. It noted:
"The Hawkins privilege is invoked, not to exclude private marital
communications, but rather to exclude evidence of criminal acts and
of communications made in the presence of third persons. No other
testimonial privilege sweeps so broadly.""' The Court's observa-
tion is almost correct. Most other evidentiary privileges are based
upon recognition of the importance of confidentiality to socially im-
portant relationships. This includes the Marital Communications
Privilege. Like other modem evidentiary privileges, it is limited to
confidential communications within a specified relationship.
109. The criteria are:
1. There must be an expectation of confidence at the time of the
communication.
2. Confidential communications must be essential to the relationship.
3. The relation between the communicants must be one which society
wishes to be "sedulously fostered."
4. Injury to the relation by disclosure must outweigh the benefit to the
litigation.
See 8 WiGmopn, supra note 93, § 2285.
110. For a discussion of the marital privacy interests balanced against the rights
of the press under the First Amendment, see Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 747
F. Supp. 1515 (ED. Pa. 1990) (police officer and wife brought action against news-
paper reporter after newspaper stories based on information contained in confiden-
tial police report were published; on motion of newspaper and reporter for summary
judgment, the District Court held that rights of newspaper and reporter under press
clause of Frst Amendment outweighed privacy rights of police officer and his wife).
111. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 51. Today, the availability of the Mar-
ital Communications Privilege in circumstances similar to those in Trammel is also
problematic. See, e.g., United States v. Dowdy, 738 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Mo. 1990)
(referring to fact that a number of courts have held that the marital privileges are
not available where the spouses jointly participated in criminal activity).
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The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege goes beyond protection of
confidential communications within the subject relationship. It ex-
tends to all testimony, things seen as well as things said in confi-
dence. It extends to public acts witnessed by the spouse, as well as
those done in private. It even extends to things known by the wit-
ness spouse before the marriage. All other privileges permit only
prevention of relevant testimony about confidential communica-
tions within the protected relationship. The Spouses' Testimonial
Privilege prevents all testimony against the party spouse. 112
There is, however, another evidentiary privilege that has a scope
as broad as that of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege-the Privilege
against Self-Incrimination. The Privilege against Self-Incrimination
and the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege are broader than other privi-
leges for exactly the same reason-they both are designed to protect
something other than the confidentiality of communications. They
both seek to protect a source of evidence, rather than a type of
communication.
The breadth of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is also sup-
ported by a recognition that the marriage relationship is different
from all the other relationships protected by evidentiary privi-
leges." 3 Marriage is a more pervasive relationship than any other
granted the protection of an evidentiary privilege. It is more perva-
sive on both the social and personal scales. More people are, have
been, and will be involved in the marriage relationship than in al-
most any other within our society. For better or worse, nuclear fam-
ilies and the marriages they spawn, continue to provide the
predominant elemental social structure of our culture.
The attorney/client, doctor/patient, and all other relationships
protected by evidentiary privileges are inherently limited. They in-
volve a single aspect of the individual's life. Marriage has a far
broader and deeper impact on the lives of the people involved. It
touches most, if not all aspects of both persons' lives. Not only is
the subject matter of the marital relationship broader, the degree of
112. raditionally the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege was said to protect only tes-
timony adverse to the witness' spouse, hence the name "Anti-Marital Facts Privi-
lege." However, this appellation is as misleading as it is clumsy. The privilege had
to be invoked by one of the spouses. Once invoked, it was presumed the testimony
would be adverse. Opponents do not offer, and parties do not object to, favorable
testimony. A similar presumption is apparent in the conversion of the old hearsay
exception for "admissions against interest" into the exclusion of "admissions by a
party opponent" in the definition of hearsay under FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2). This
presumption is to be distinguished from the "statements against interest" exception
recognized under Rule 804(b)(3).
113. See Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the
Rights of Relationships, 75 CAi. L. Rnv. 1593 (1987) (arguing that the "atomistic"
focus on individual rights in considering privacy issues ignores the real and socially
valuable sharing of privacy and expectations of loyalty in a host of personal
relationships).
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contact runs deeper. You visit your lawyer and doctor. You live
with your spouse.
Marriage also differs from the other relationships protected by ev-
identiary privileges in another pertinent respect. In today's society,
the relationship is mutual. The obligations and rights of each are
reciprocal in a way that is not true of any of the other relationships.
The Attorney-Client Privilege protects the interests of clients, not
lawyers. The Doctor-Patient Privilege protects patients, not doctors.
The marital privileges are intended to protect the interests in the
relationship of both parties, wives and husbands. The very changes
in the societal expectations of marriage noted by the Court in Tram-
mel distinguish the marital relationship from all others enjoying an
evidentiary privilege.
The breadth, depth, and mutuality of the marital relationship are
the factors that distinguish it from all others. Arguably, such factors
might also justify the broader and deeper protections afforded by
the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege.
Justice Black's opinion in Hawkins"4 is not caused by a failure to
notice that women were no longer "regarded as chattel or
demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity . . . ."'1 Justice
Black and the Court majority concluded that the need to protect the
marital relationship had not diminished over the centuries, notwith-
standing changes in sexual roles within and outside the family.
Stripped of its appeal to political correctness, the Trammel opinion
suffers from confusion over the distinction between competency and
privilege. This led the Court to confuse the very different historical
policies underlying each.
However, none of the flaws in the Trammel opinion mandates a
different outcome. As Dean Wigmore remarked about the privilege
against self-incrimination: "The history of the privilege does not set-
tle the policy of the privilege.""' 6 The decision might still be justi-
fied. Has society's interest in protecting marriage and the family
changed? Have the courts' needs for "every [one's] evidence"
increased?
IV. COMPETING SOCIAL VALUES
We turn now to consider the essence of all evidentiary privileges:
achieving an appropriate balance between competing social values.
The Court in Trammel said: "Here we must decide whether the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in
the administration of ... justice.""' Underlying this statement of
114. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
115. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 52.
116. 8 WiGMoRE, supra note 93, § 2251.
117. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 51.
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the question is the assumption that " 'the public ... has a right to
every man's evidence.' "118 All relevant evidence is presumed nec-
essary. The burden of persuasion rests with those who would sub-
ject the court's need for evidence to some other social value. All
other values will be given primacy only if they demonstrably out-
weigh the need for evidence. 119
This is the traditional definition of the problem, a definition for-
mulated by judges and legal scholars. It is hardly surprising that it
begins with the presumption that courts have a need for and right to
compel all evidence from all sources. A functionally objective anal-
ysis might suggest an opposite hypothesis. For example: Testimony
is compellable only where the need for the evidence is sufficiently
important to outweigh the societal costs of producing the evidence.
No one would seriously argue for a rule requiring all litigants to
establish that the need for evidence outweighs the costs of produc-
tion in every instance. There is a strong societal interest in adminis-
tering justice based on factual truth. The need for probative
evidence to achieve this end clearly outweighs the normative socie-
tal costs of compelling attendance and testimony by parties and non-
party witnesses. Nevertheless, ignoring the underlying presumption
can have an unintended consequence. The legal profession tends to
forget that the administration of justice is not the paramount value
of our society.' 20
A. A Debate Without Data: Testing the Breeze with Wetted Finger
The Trammel Court considered four issues when weighing the so-
cial costs and benefits of the Spouses' Marital Privilege, two on each
side of the scales. Benefits considered are (1) the courts' need for
evidence and (2) the government's need for spousal testimony in
criminal cases. Costs considered are (1) the importance of marriage
and family relationships and (2) the protection provided to those
relationships by the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege. We shall con-
sider each of these issues in turn. Before doing so, however, a few
observations about the limitations on this approach are appropriate.
The basic approach is that of a cost-benefit analysis. Theoretically
this type of empirical social accounting is an appropriate method of
"weighing" the competing social needs, but there is a problem.
118. Id. (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
119. Id. at 50 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 638, 709-10 (1974)). See
also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 93, § 2285 (privileges are an exception to the general
principle that all persons must give evidence and are justified only by the "prepon-
derance of extrinsic policy").
120. See Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv.
L. REv. 1450, 1479-80 (1985) (arguing that because of the lack of social cost-benefit
data on privilege, "placement of the burden of justification can effectively determine
whether or not a privilege is recognized").
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Although the empirical critique's attention to the actual ef-
fects of privileges is commendable, its conclusions are gener-
ally overstated. First, although the benefits attributable to
privileges are difficult to estimate, there is little reason to as-
sume that they are necessarily small. Second, the critique mis-
takenly adopts Wigmore's assumption that the costs imposed
by privileges are "plain and concrete." In fact, these costs are
no easier to estimate than the benefits. Third, no solid empiri-
cal data exists to support the estimates of either critics or pro-
ponents as to either the costs or the benefits of privileges. In
short, legal decision makers face a perhaps unavoidable empir-
ical indeterminacy.' 2 1
The Trammel opinion refers to no empirical data directly measuring
either the cost or benefits of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege.1Z
Another problem lurks in a court's attempt to adapt the cost-ben-
efit analysis tool of social science to its own legal purpose. Social
science and the courts both seek the truth, but, as Professor Tanford
points out, they often pursue a different truth. "Scientific truth is
general, probabilistic and arrived at over time. Legal truth is in-
dividualistic, may be improbable and must be determined
immediately.' 23
These dichotomies are here in Trammel. The question of privi-
lege in Trammel was raised in a drug conspiracy trial. It is unlikely
either counsel came to court prepared to offer evidence on the rela-
tive societal value of the court's need for evidence and the institu-
tion of marriage. However important the issue, the trial judge
would be expected to resolve it quickly. In the normal course of
events the trial court's decision and, therefore, the appellate record,
is not likely to contain scientific analysis. Instead, it comprises con-
clusory arguments based on common law, common sense, and sub-
jective opinions drawn from the anecdotal experiences of counsel
and the trial judge.
The simple fact is that courts are not intended to be policy-making
institutions. Federal judges are appointed to administer the rule of
law. Policy formulation is neither the primary nor usual function of
the courts. Court procedures are simply not designed to develop
and decide policy issues. When forced to the task, a court makes
121. id. at 1474-75 (footnotes omitted).
122. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 48-50. The Trammel Court did en-
gage in a survey of the treatment of the privilege by state courts and legislatures. A
survey can produce empirical data, but the data produced in Trammel is limited to
the way in which other courts have decided the issues. It says nothing about the
assumptions or data upon which those decisions were based.
123. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 IND. LJ. 137, 168 (1990) (examining the tendency of
courts to disregard or distort empirical data from the social sciences concerning jury
behavior).
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policy like a hammer drives a screw. It can be done, but the process
is risky and the results dubious.124
It is unlikely that empirical data sufficient to engage in a true cost-
benefit analysis will be available in the foreseeable future. Courts
will continue to be forced to determine the relative costs of the com-
peting social values based upon circumstantial evidence. The same
limitations apply to assessment of the benefits accruing to those
values.
The Court faced more than a lack of data when confronted by Mr.
Trammel's appeal. The United States had voiced no federal policy
on the family and marriage. Less than five years earlier Congress
had attempted but failed to agree on an appropriate balance of soci-
etal values in the Spouses' Marital Privilege."'- It is hardly surpris-
ing that the Court's examination of the privilege in Trammel is
based largely upon abstract logical analysis applied to unverified
and often unspoken assumptions.
We turn now to consider the Court's efforts to assess the social
values at stake and the effect of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege.
B. The Court's Need for Evidence
The Court acknowledges that the social value of administering
justice is finite. This principle is the basis for all evidentiary privi-
leges.1 6 It is also necessary to remember that the need for relevant
evidence is not theoretically insatiable. Federal Rule of Evidence
403 is based upon a recognition that the need for evidence is finite.
Beyond unfair prejudice, relevant evidence may be excluded for
matters as mundane as social and judicial economy.1 27 Rape shield
laws and hearsay exceptions intended to preclude the need to pro-
duce child abuse victims provide additional examples of accepted
124. The need for, and historically late development of, the Brandeis brief
demonstrate the ad hoc context of attempts to remedy the functional limitations
faced by courts confronted with a need to create public policy.
125. WEISTEIN, supra note 43.
126. Trammel v. United States, 445-U.S. at 51.
127. FED. R. Evin. 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Preju-
dice, Confusion, or Waste of Time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Similarly, motions for protection from discovery are often decided by balancing the
social cost of production against the evidentiary forensic benefit. The issue is di-
rectly raised by FED. R. EviD. 403, which permits exclusion of relevant evidence
based on "considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Rule 403 of course preserves the Wigmorian bias by permit-
ting exclusion only when the probative value is substantially outweighed by these
extraneous concerns.
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limitations on the need for relevant testimony.12- The law has al-
ways recognized that some evidence is not worth the effort or cost.
Nowhere does the Trammel Court consider what evidence might
be obtainable only from a defendant's spouse. Foremost in this cat-
egory would be words spoken in confidence-communications also
protected by the Marital Communications Privilege. Unlike private
marital communications, public exchanges are not lost to evidence
by the imposition of either privilege; the witness spouse is not the
only possible source of evidence for public acts or communications
by the defendant. However, a private exchange can be lost to evi-
dence if the spouse does not testify. What is the evidence lost to the
court through the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege? It is evidence of
the defendant's private acts witnessed only by defendant's spouse.
Although evidence in this category may have been given by Eliza-
beth Trammel at her husband's trial, none is apparent on the appel-
late record. The trips to the Far East were public and subject to
proof by others, including immigration and customs officers. His
hidden purpose and surreptitious importation of drugs also were
known to others.
128. FED. R. EviD. 412 provides in relevant part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of title 18, United
States Code, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of
an alleged victim of such offense is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of title 18, United
States Code, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputa-
tion or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such evidence other
than reputation or opinion evidence is -
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) and is
constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of -
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, of-
fered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or
was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or
injury;, or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to
the sexual behavior with respect to which such offense is alleged.
Although only a few states have adopted a recognizable version of the Federal Rule,
all but two states have some provision shielding victims of rape from inquiry into
their sexual practices and history. 1 GEORGE P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURO
ET AL., EVIDENCE IN AtMRicA: THE FEDERAL RunES IN Tim STATES, ch. 22, at 2-3
(1990). For an example of an exception to the hearsay rule, see ME. REv. STAT.
ANN., tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1994), referring to certain out-of-court statements
made by minors describing sexual contact. The effect is to eliminate the factfinder's
ability to observe the victim's demeanor while testifying.
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The Court's opinion in Trammel suggests the passage of time may
create the need for change.' 29 The opinion offers no discussion of
the effect of scientific, technical, and other forensic developments
on the need for spousal evidence. The implicit assumption of Tram-
mel is exactly the opposite, that there has been no change in the
forensic need for spousal evidence during the last one hundred fifty
years. The Trammel opinion assumes the Spouses' Testimonial Priv-
ilege is as much an impediment to the pursuit of truth as ever it was:
"As Jeremy Bentham observed more than a century and a half ago,
such a privilege goes far beyond making 'every man's house his cas-
tle,' and permits a person to convert his house into a 'den of
thieves.' "130 Bentham's argument is premised upon an assumption
that the home is an impenetrable fortress of privacy. Jeremy Ben-
tham may have been correct in 1827. Until this century, law en-
forcement lacked the technical means to penetrate the close of the
family home. Events inside the home were often known only to the
defendant and spouse. The privilege against self-incrimination
nailed shut the front door.'3 ' The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege
boarded up the back.
Times have changed. Law enforcement's need for spousal testi-
mony is less today than it was in Jeremy Bentham's time. It is now
possible to surreptitiously witness and record events within homes
and other private spaces.' 32 Other advances in forensic science also
decrease the need for spousal testimony by providing alternative av-
enues of proof.
129. One example of a social force with potential for impact on spousal testi-
mony requirements is the perceived need to convict more felons and thereby win the
"War on Crime."
130. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 51-52 (quoting 5 JEREMY BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JuDICIAL EVIDENCE 340 (1827)).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Jeremy Bentham also "aimed his rhetorical guns at
the privilege against self-incrimination," causing "a good deal of debate about its
desirability." William Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLuM. L. RIv.
1227, 1232 (1988). Professor Stuntz suggests that the rules and limitations of the
privilege against self-incrimination are viewed as "simply inexplicable." Id. at 1228.
He concludes there is merit to the view that "no good theory" explains the case law
of the Fifth Amendment. Id. However heated the debate, the privilege against self-
incrimination is well insulated by the Fifth Amendment. The marital privileges,
however, have no such protection. The reason for this difference may have more to
do with timing than with the framers' intent. When the Bill of Rights was written,
the marital privileges were accepted fixtures of the law. The privilege against self-
incrimination was not. It is possible that the inclusion of the latter in the Bill of
Rights was because the drafters wanted to assure the same status as the marital
privilege. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 292-94 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (self-
incrimination was not recognized in all colonies and was included in the Bill of
Rights in awareness of its tenuous acceptance).
132. Although beyond the scope of this Article, another line of inquiry might
include comparison of evidentiary privileges with limits on investigatory information
gathering due to privacy concerns with limits on the compulsion of testimony con-
veying the same information.
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There is no convenient method of quantifying the impact of such
advances upon the need for spousal testimony. There are limita-
tions on the use of these technical advances. Court approval is nec-
essary. Approval is generally available only after law enforcement
already has probable cause to suspect criminal activity. Technical
and personnel resources also limit technological evidence-gathering.
For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that law enforcement will be
able to fully exploit the available technology in any but the most
serious cases.
Nevertheless, it is clear the need for evidence-from any
source-is not constant. A lack of definitive data on changes in the
need for such evidence is not justification for ignoring that such
changes occur. There is an explanation for the Court's failure to
pause as it passed by 150 years of scientific, technical, and forensic
progress. It was in a hurry to reach another issue, an issue outside
the traditional calculus of privilege justification.
C. The War on Crime
The focus of the Court's concern in Trammel is apparent in its
reference to the ideas of Jeremy Bentham. The Court adopted Ben-
tham's assertion that the privilege has the potential to convert the
family home into a "den of thieves."' 33 The Court also agreed with
Bentham's assertion that the privilege "secures, to every man, one
safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for every imagi-
nable crime."'134
The entire Trammel opinion resonates to a chord of concern over
the problem of crime in our society. The focus is not upon the
courts' "need for probative evidence in the administration of jus-
tice."'3 5 Instead, the Court's focus is on the evidentiary needs of
law enforcement.'36 This is an astounding shift in approach away
from the traditional analysis of evidentiary privileges. Even more
remarkable is the Court's failure to notice or, at least, remark upon
the change.' 37
The Supreme Court's hearkening to Bentham's rhetoric is appro-
priate, although in an undoubtedly unintended way. Jeremy Ben-
tham's public life spanned the late Georgian period in England. He
133. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 51-52 (quoting 5 RENrwu t RAxnON-
ALE OF JuDICIAL EvIDENCE 340 (1827)).
134. Id. at 52.
135. Id. at 51.
136. "This modification... furthers the important public interest in marital har-
mony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs." Id. at 53.
137. For a recent reverberation of this change see In re Grand Jury Investigation,
918 F.2d 374 (3rd Cir. 1990) (applying to the Clergy Privilege the general rule that
evidentiary privileges should be narrowly construed, especially in criminal
proceedings).
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died on the threshold of the Victorian age. 3 ' For all of his re-
forming zeal, Bentham was a creature of his times. Robert Hughes
draws a portrait of Bentham's England which is hauntingly familiar
to modem eyes.
[T]he rising crime-rate-or rather, the belief that it was ris-
ing-became a potent issue. Accordingly, the Georgian legis-
lators fought back against a threat which they believed came
from a whole class .... Georgian fear of the "mob" led to
Victorian belief in a "criminal class ...."
The idea of a criminal class, as understood by the English in
the 1830s, meant that a distinct social group "produced" crime,
as hatters produced hats or miners coal. It was part mob, part
tribe and part guild, and it led a subterranean existence below
and between the lower social structures of England ....
The fear of crime itself cast an exaggerated solidity on "the
distinct body of thieves, whose life and business is to follow up
a determined warfare against the constituted authorities" and
who "may be known almost by their very gait in the streets
from other persons ......
The idea that, in the words of a colonial judge in the 1850s,
"crime descends, as surely as physical [appearance] and indi-
vidual temperament," was the very axis of the idea of a crimi-
nal class; it was also, of course, the key reason for all social
discrimination ....
... What was the cause of crime? Criminals, who manufac-
tured or, rather, secreted it from their inner nature, as snakes
their venom or eels their slime. 139
138. Jeremy Bentham lived from 1748 to 1832. JEREMY BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, (Earland Publishing 1978) (1827). Queen Victoria reigned
from 1837 to 1901.
139. ROBERT HUoi-IS, THE FATAL SHORE (1987) (a history of the settlement of
Australia by convicts transported from England). Although initially reluctant, the
English eventually felt compelled to incur whatever risks an organized police force
carried to personal liberty. Peel's Police Act was enacted in 1829. Id. at 26. The
result was a sharp increase in the number of prisoners. Although there was much
contemporary concern over increase in the rate of crime, it now appears the dra-
matic increase in convicts resulted from more efficient detection and prosecution.
Id. at 164.
The idea of biological linkage "has a long history .... Law violators were de-
scribed as a distinct physical type [recognizable] at birth with distinct physical fea-
tures .... This conceptualization had extensive impact on criminology and social
policy for over a third of a century, but current-day scientists have accumulated suf-
ficient evidence to reject it. RrrA WICKs-NELsON & ALLEN C. ISRAEL, BEHAVIOR
DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD 165 (2d ed. 1991). Unfortunately, similar perceptions
tempt to similar generalizations. The issue of biological causes for criminal behavior
has not been abandoned. The temptation to leap to biological conclusions can be
irresistible for some. Skin color is more readily identifiable than peculiarities of gait.
What is more, there is no denying that racial differences are based on genetic differ-
ences. Current studies suggest an "increased genetic link" in antisocial behavior that
persists through adolescent delinquency into criminal behavior as an adult. This has
led to a new crime-genetics hypothesis and a call for additional research. Id. (citing
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Contemporary attempts to stem the rising tide of crime also seem
to parallel those of Georgian England. Law enforcement relied
heavily upon informants induced to cooperate through rewards.14
The courts also came in for criticism. The entire judicial system
seemed soft on crime.
There was distress at the "tenderness" of the English legal
system .... Georgian justice may look fierce to us, but seen
from Europe then it was lenient. The suspect... could not be
tortured until he confessed; he could not be held indefinitely
without bail or trial; and he was innocent until proven guilty.
The liberalism of English Common Law.. . astonished Euro-
pean visitors. They noticed that, although it reduced the likeli-
hood of an innocent man's conviction, it also made it easier for
the guilty to escape [punishment].
The English knew this, too; hence the draconic laws they
created to avenge their sense of a disturbed social order.
Against the relative fairness of British trials, one must set the
most striking aspect of Georgian law-the sheer scope of its
capital statutes.r 41
By 1819, the preceding 150 years had seen the enactment of al-
most 200 new criminal statutes prescribing capital punishment.
There was also a growing tendency to eliminate judicial discretion in
sentencing-" 2 "Such legislation was part of a general tendency in
eighteenth-century England: the growth of the Rule of Law... into
a supreme ideology, a form of religion which, it has since been ar-
gued, began to replace the waning moral power of the Church of
England.' '1 43
What Bentham hoped to achieve by abrogating the Spouses' Tes-
timonial Privilege is clear from the unquoted portions of the para-
graph cited by the Court in Trammel. He argues that without the
Michael Rutter et al., Genetic Factors in Child Psychiatric Disorders-ll. Empirical
Findngs, 31 J. oF CHILD PSYCHOL. AND PsYc~iAmRY 39 (1990).
A similar approach is reflected in a recent report from the United States Justice
Department. It recently released a study showing that persons convicted of commit-
ting crimes are more likely to have relatives who were also convicted of crimes than
are "other" persons. The media, and even academic reaction to the study is thor-
oughly Georgian. "Some [leading] criminologists say that the figures provide strik-
ing new evidence for the theory that criminality tends to run in families, particularly
those of more violent criminals." Crime Runs in Families, Data Show, MANE SuN.
DAY TELEGRAM, Feb. 9, 1992, at Bl. One criminologist is quoted as saying: "This
shows that where you really learn delinquency is from your family." Id. See also
Wscics-NEisoN & IsRmAr supra at 160-83 (citing studies supporting "widespread
agreement" that delinquency and other behavior disorders in children are strongly
influenced by the family).
140. HuoHms, supra note 138, at 26-27. ("The pickings were large enough to
support a whole subclass of informers, police narks and thief-takers.").
141. Id. at 28-29.
142. Id. at 29-31.
143. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted).
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privilege "a man could not carry on schemes of injustice, without
being in danger, every moment, of being disturbed . . ." by his
wife-and also subject to the risk of being "betrayed and exposed to
punishment,-by his wife.""' If this were the policy, Bentham pre-
dicted that crime would "be rare.' 41
Bentham's presumption that the Marital Privilege converted the
home from castle to dark tower of evil makes perfect sense-given
the assumptions of a criminal class and its inherently evil nature.
Moreover, the righteous do not need the benefits of such a privilege.
They are not likely to find themselves in the dock where the privi-
lege might prove important.
Nor is it surprising that a modem ear might find some appeal in
Bentham's argument. Today we share similar perceptions. We
seem to be inundated by a cresting wave of crime. Substitute subur-
bia for town house, drugs for gin, confidential informants for thief
takers, and you have a description many Americans would recog-
nize as a portrait of our times.
Certainly, crime is a fact of modem life. Forty-two percent of all
Americans will be victims of violent crime at least once after the age
of twelve. Ninety-nine out of one hundred will be victims of per-
sonal theft. Eighty-seven percent of us will be victims of theft three
or more times. Homicide is the eleventh leading cause of death in
our country. For Americans between the ages of fifteen and thirty-
four, it is the second leading cause of death.'46 There is little won-
der that law abiding citizenry might develop a siege mentality. The
authorities have been unable to build an effective dike. Nor have
we been able to stem the flood at its source.
Similar perceptions also suggest similar solutions. Law enforce-
ment budgets have increased on both the federal and local levels.
We have seen a resurgence in the willingness to inflict capital pun-
ishment. In 1994 Congress enacted and the President signed a crime
bill creating sixty new capital crimes.'4 7 The new Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines are rarely referred to without the adjective "stiff."
Even the Georgian House of Lords would be impressed. In June of
1994, the prison population in the United States grew to over one
million. Another 450,000 were inmates in local and county jails. 48
If there is a lesson to be learned from Georgian England, it is that
increased convictions and ever more drastic penalties are ineffective
in stemming social disorder. Georgian England managed to survive
144. JEREMY BENrHAM, supra note 137, at 339-40.
145. Id at 340.
146. BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME AND JuSTICE 28-29 (2d ed. 1988).
147. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
148. State and Federal Prison Population Tops One Million, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
BJS 202-307-0784 (Oct. 27, 1994).
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into the social tranquility of its Victorian and Edwardian times with
the marital and other evidentiary privileges intact. Furthermore, the
national experience of Australia represents an immense obstacle to
any theory of criminality based on genetics or of familial sub-
culture.
Notwithstanding the initial disclaimer, there is some empirical
data available that bears indirectly on this aspect of the problem.
The data does not permit a precise calculus of the costs to law en-
forcement of the privilege. It does, however, provide an interesting
perspective. The beneficence of Congress and energy of the Justice
Department have produced a plethora of statistical data on crime.
United States law enforcement has adopted a "body count" measure
of success. These statistics have some uses beyond justifying the
vast infusion of resources into law enforcement and the current
need for more. If they prove anything, it is that the perceived fail-
ure to win the War on Crime does not lie in an inability to convict
and imprison.
Federal prosecutors are efficient in convicting those they prose-
cute with or without Trammel. Their conviction rates were 76.4% in
1980, when Trammel was decided. The rate increased only 3.5%
over the next five years. There is no evidence suggesting that even
this small increase resulted from the change wrought in Trammel.
The high conviction rate does, however, suggest an outer limit for
the possible gain to law enforcement. From 1986 through 1989, the
conviction rate hovered at about 81%. During the same period, the
number of cases dismissed went down. In 1980, 19.7% of all cases in
U.S. District Courts were dismissed. The number of dismissals de-
clined to 17.1% in 1985 and has wandered between 15.4% and
16.1% for the years 1986 through 1989.119 An overall conviction
rate of 80% would seem close to the theoretical maximum for any
system requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nor does the high level of plea bargains result in meaningless pe-
nal consequences for defendants. According to the Department of
Justice, 71% of all persons convicted of felonies are incarcerated,
37% for more than one year.15 0 As a result more than 2,600,000
149. BUREAU OF JUsTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 1980-87, at 10-12 (1990). It is
not clear what percentage of the dismissals were in exchange for guilty pleas to other
charges. The conviction rates of federal prosecutors are comparable to those of the
state attorneys general and the local district attorneys. The median among a sam-
pling of 26 jurisdictions was a conviction rate of 73% for cases tried in the states'
felony courts. The range ran from a high of 88% in Dallas to a low of 52% in Rhode
Island. BuREU OF Jusnc STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 84 (2d ed. 1988). The Department of Justice re-
ports most cases brought by state prosecutors result in conviction by guilty pleas. A
sampling of 28 jurisdictions shows a range from 82% in Los Angeles down to 26% in
Philadelphia. The mean among those surveyed was 62.5%. Id. at 83.
150. 1a at 97.
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adults were under correctional care, custody or supervision in 1988.
This number represented 1.5% of the entire adult population. The
percentage of males in custody is higher. The percentage of black
males in custody is higher still.' 5 ' The numbers are higher for
juveniles. In 1985, about 3% of all the children in our country were
in custody.' 52
Starting in about 1973, the number of persons in prison in the
United States reached a new high every year. As noted above, the
current number of prison inmates passed one million in 1994.153
The percentage of the population in prison also reached new highs
each year. It is fair to assume the number would have been even
higher but for a lack of available cell space. The probation popula-
tion was growing at a slightly faster rate. By 1985, one of every
ninety-four people you passed on the street was likely to be on
probation.'5 4
Since 1990 federal prosecutors have increased the percentage of
those who are sentenced to prison and the length of their sentences.
In 1980, 46% of all persons convicted in federal court were sent to
prison for an average prison sentence of 44.3 months. By 1989, the
percentage of those sent to prison had grown to 58.5%. By then, the
average sentence increased to 53.4 months. 55 All of these numbers
will increase as an ever greater proportion of the current prison pop-
ulation comprises individuals sentenced under the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.
The available data suggest that any social benefit realized from
increased empowerment of prosecutors is likely to be statistically
insignificant. The gain or loss of adverse testimony by the defend-
ant's spouse is unlikely to prove the straw that breaks the back of
crime. We already have convicted and imprisoned a higher percent-
age of our population than any other nation in the world. The Brit-
ish experience in the last century and our lack of a subcontinent to
which we can conveniently exile an even higher percentage of our
population suggest we might do better by seeking other solutions.
Certainly, the prospects for improvement do not warrant putting
law enforcement at the pinnacle of our social values.
151. State and Federal Prison Population Tops One Million, supra note 147 (re-
porting 43 women per 100,000 population were prisoners versus 719 men per 100,000
population; 116 per 100,000 white residents were prisoners versus 1,432 per 100,000
black residents).
152. BuREAu OF Jusric STATISTICS, supra note 148 at 102-03.
153. State and Prison Population Tops One Million, supra note 147.
154. IcL at 104.
155. BuR.Au OF JUsTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICM
PROGRAMS, supra note 148, at 16-17.
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D. Marriage and the Family
The Trammel Court's examination of the extrajudicial side of the
scale was a two-fold analysis. First, it looked for changes in the im-
portance of marriage and the nuclear family. Second, the Court
considered the efficacy of the privilege in accomplishing its intended
purpose.
We can duplicate the actual analysis without wasting much paper.
First, the Court noted that the family, home, and marriage were "al-
ready subject to much erosion in our day."' 5 6 The societal value of
marriage was implied in the Court's conclusion that, because of such
"erosion," caution was warranted. 15 7
The Court then noted the absence of a federal policy on families
and the traditional deference to the states on such issues. The Court
remarked that just over half of the state legislatures or courts had
limited or abolished the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege.'5
Having finished with its examination of the value of marriage and
family as social institutions, the Court turned to consider the impact
of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege on them. The Court said there
was "little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to pre-
serve" if one spouse could be induced to testify against the other
merely to avoid a lengthy prison sentence.' 5 9 Following Alice
through the looking glass, the Court argued that the privilege actu-
ally destroyed marriages. The privilege permitted the party spouse
to send the witness spouse to prison by depriving him or her of the
opportunity to become a government witness."6 In the Court's esti-
mation, the change would not encourage the government to pit
spouses against one another, since it was already free to do so under
the existing law.161 The Court concluded that its change to the
Spouses' Testimonial Privilege would not impair its purpose of fur-
thering marital harmony.'6 2
We shall utilize a parallel if slightly broader approach. We also
have the benefit of fifteen years hindsight. As already mentioned,
there was no federal policy on families and marriage for the Court
to implement. Nor could the Court ignore the problems exper-
ienced with adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The polit-
ical lesson seemed to be that the traditional consensus supporting
the marital privileges had eroded. In Congress at least, it seemed
that both proponents and opponents of the privilege were a minor-
156. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 47-48.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 48-50.
159. Id. at 52.
160. Id. at 52-53.
161. Id. at 52 n.12.
162. I& at 53.
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ity. Nor was there a middle ground which could command a
majority.
1. Shifting Breezes
The Court approached the issues raised in Trammel at what ap-
pears in retrospect to have been a watershed in social and political
thought about family and marriage. The case was argued in 1979
and decided in the second month of the new decade. The experi-
ence of the 1970s seemed to confirm that of the 1960s. Many of the
social changes, especially those associated with the Sexual Revolu-
tion, were more than transient fads. The first AIDS cases in
America were not reported by the Centers for Disease Control until
June 1981.163
At the time the Court considered Mr. Trammel's appeal, there
was deep-seated confusion over the viability, importance, desirabil-
ity, or future of the nuclear family and traditional marriage. In the
words of Bruce Hafen, there was "a growing sense of uncertainty
about the place of the formal family in our hierarchy of national
values."'" Hafen noted a dearth of "legal and other literature [ex-amining] ... the broad social policies underlying the preference his-
torically given by the law to family relationships."165 He found the
absence of such material remarkable. Especially when compared to
the amount of scholarly effort devoted to individual rights. As a
result "the case law and other commentary on our traditional as-
163. H. ROBERT MALINOWSKY & GERALD J. PERRY, AIDS INFORMATION
SOURCE BOOK, 1 (1989).
164. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 465
(1983). See also RICHARD H. KLEMER, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 19
(1970) ("All the professional observers of the American family agree that there have
been many changes in recent times in family experiences and family roles. There
most agreement ceases.") Klemer cites a survey of eighteen experts taken in the
1940s. Each was asked to list the most significant changes in the experience of
American families. "The lack of unanimity in the replies was impressive. The group
reported a total of sixty-three changes, but only one change, the increasing divorce
rate, was reported by all. Only eight changes were mentioned by at least half the
experts."
The eight changes were (1) increasing divorce rate (mentioned by all eight-
een); (2) wider diffusion of birth control and/or decline in family size (men-
tioned by 12); (3) decline in authority of husbands and fathers (mentioned
by twelve); (4) increased sexual intercourse apart from marriage (men-
tioned by eleven); (5) increase in the number of wives working for pay
(mentioned by eleven); (6) increasing individualism and freedom of family
members (mentioned by ten); (7) increasing transfer of protective func-
tions from family to state (mentioned by ten); (8) decline of religious be-
havior in marriage and family (mentioned by nine).
Id at n.2. All eight of those changes continued to increase through 1970 when
Klemer's book was published.
165. Hafen, supra note 163, at 472.
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sumptions seldom go beyond platitudes and clich6s."''1  Professor
Hafen was writing after the decision in Trammel; his view may well
have been partially influenced by it, but still reflects a mood of the
times that extends beyond a single case.
The early 1980s were days of "fully flowered egalitarianism."' 67
The academic journals and texts were filled with articles suggesting
that the nuclear family and traditional marriage were doomed. Two
classic theories were developed to explain the increasing destabiliza-
tion of families in the United States. Carle C. Zimmerman theo-
rized that family structures within advancing societies evolved
according to a natural cycle, progressing from the "Trustee Family"
to the "Domestic Family," and culminating in the "Atomistic Fam-
ily," in which individual welfare and control predominated. 16s Zim-
merman believed that the Atomistic Family's adoption of an
egocentric value system spelled the end of the host society. The the-
ory was extended to ratify Victorian ideals as the pinnacle of social
development. The theory fell from grace along with the Victorian
ideals it supported.' 69
The second explanation is known as the structure-function theory.
This theory holds that the changes in the family are natural re-
sponses to social and economic growth. 7 ' Social scientists believed
they detected a worldwide movement toward adoption of nuclear
family systems similar to the European pattern. They thought these
changes resulted from the worldwide spread of industrialization and
urbanization.17' Over time, changes in the American family did not
match those in the economic structure of the nation,"7 and the
structure-function theory developed deeper problems. It simply did
not fit the data.
it was seen that "primitive" societies ... might have very
complex religious and kinship systems, and that modern stone-
using societies do not all have the same social systems. More-
over, since all [humans] presumably come from the same evo-
166. Id.
167. Id at 467.
168. KLbmR, supra note 163, at 21-22.
169. WiuAM J. GOODE, WORLD REVOLUTION AND FAmy PATrTERNs 3 (1963).
170. KLEiMR, supra note 163, at 21-22.
171. GOODE, supra note 168, at 2-26.
172. This initial discrepancy between theory and reality was explained by the
"Lag Theory," which hypothesized that the familial changes simply moved at a
slower pace than economic and social changes. This "lag" seemed to explain stresses
within the private institutions of civil society, which were unable to keep pace with
changing conditions. It also appeared to explain why public laws aimed at reforming
the civil institutions kept missing the target. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HAgv. L REv. 1497, 1513-20
(1983).
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lutionary line and are equally distant historically from Cro-
Magnon men, all societies are equally old.17
There was another problem. No correlation could demonstrate a
connection between economic development and family structure,
"although they are often assumed to be well known." '174
Writing in 1970, Klemer concluded that the American family had
become "increasingly fragile in fact and possibly even more so in
attitude.' 17" Klemer thought that the primary reason for the contin-
uing increase in fragility of marriages was that personal "happiness
... replaced stability as the major goal of marriage partners. Since
happiness is more elusive and less easily measured than stability, it
is now much easier to convince oneself that a marriage has
failed.' 176 Every long-term relationship177 is bound to experience
less than "happy" moments. If the goal of the marriage is individual
happiness, such moments are likely to be perceived as evidence the
marriage has failed. Personal unhappiness is now socially accepta-
ble as a valid reason for divorce.
This explanation for increased divorce rates gained widespread
acceptance among sociologists and psychiatrists alike. There is,
however, no general agreement with Klemer's suggestion that the
expectation and pursuit of individual happiness is a mistake. Law-
rence Casler is an example of someone who reached the opposite
conclusion. In 1974, he wrote Is Marriage Necessary? Casler's an-
swer was a resounding "No.' 7 8 Casler agrees that mutual depen-
dence of spouses is a hallmark of a stable marriage. But that does
not make it a good thing.
If an individual has so few resources that happiness is im-
possible without someone to lean on, then he is in a state of
grave emotional impoverishment. And the longer he uses this
type of psychological crutch, the more likely he is to remain
emotionally crippled.
173. See supra note 168.
174. Id. at 4.
175. RIcHARD H. KLEMER, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 21 (1970).
176. Id. at 22. See also, KENNETH C. W. KAMMEYER, CONFRONTING THE ISSUES:
SEX ROLES, MARRIAGE, AND THE FAmmY 11-12 (Kenneth C. W. Kammeyer ed.,
1975) (Marriage "is an institution that evolved over centuries to meet some very
specific needs of a nonindustrial society. Romantic love was viewed as tragic, or
merely irrelevant .... Marriage was not designed as a mechanism for providing
friendship, erotic experience, romantic love, personal fulfillment, continuous lay psy-
chotherapy or recreation. The Western European family was not designed to carry a
life-long load of highly emotional romantic freight. Given its present structure it
simply had to fail when asked to do so. The very idea of an irrevocable contract
obligating the parties concerned to a life-time of romantic effort is utterly absurd."
(quoting Mervyn Cadwalleder, Marriage as a Wretched Institution, 218 ATLANTIC
MoNTHLY 62 (1966))).
177. KLEMER, supra note 174, at 23.
178. LAWRENCE CASLER, Is MARRIAGE NECESSARY? 117 (1974).
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So much individuality must be sacrificed when one assumes
the yoke of conventional matrimony that we should not be
surprised to learn... that "the more highly developed the
personality, the greater the difficulty of adjustment to mar-
riage," nor ... that "adjustments to the demands of marriage
may greatly impair mental health ....
During the 1960s, the "Happiness" theory and the structure-func-
tion theory collided headlong with the "Age of Aquarius." The en-
ergy of the collision fused elements of both theories. This decade
saw the conjunction of several gravitational masses within the
United States. The postwar baby boomers reached puberty in a
tidal wave of hormones and adolescent rebellion. The birth control
pill became widely available. Personal gratification through drugs
became acceptable, a cultural/political statement, and, ultimately,
stylish. "Thin on, tune in, drop out." "Free Love." "Do your own
thing." American society appeared to be changing, if not unrav-
eling, at an unprecedented pace. Some argued that the traditional
family structure was obsolete. Others went further, claiming it had
become an obstacle to social progress. By the mid-1970s, these atti-
tudes had moved from the Haight-Ashbury to the scholarly journals.
Popular acceptance of the new gospel also progressed rapidly.
In 1966 sociologist Mervyn Cadwalleder wrote an article for
Atlantic Monthly with the title "Marriage as a Wretched Insti-
tution." I have always wondered why ... he did not come
right out and say "Marriage Is a Wretched Institution." Per-
haps that would have been too strong for the times. By 1972
Kathrin Perutz exhibited no such moderation when she pub-
lished a free-swinging anti-marriage book with the title Mar-
riage is Hell. With titles like this, and signs of dissatisfaction
coming from several other quarters as well, it is little wonder
that one of the clichds of the seventies is: "Traditional mar-
riage is under attack." Clich6 or not, the validity of the asser-
tion can hardly be denied.1i 0
Klemer, Cadwalleder, and Perutz were only three voices among
many prophesying the end of marriage and the nuclear family, or
decrying their stubborn persistence. 181 The point for our purposes is
179. Id. at 123-24 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Casler's attack on mar-
riage is based on the assumption that marriage produces a unity between spouses.
This unity results from "the almost complete mutual absorption that characterizes so
many marriages of the conventional. .. type .... I" l at 124. It is an absorption
that results in "[tihe total merger of the selves over the years . I..." d. Ironically,
Casler finds that stable marriages are likely to produce undesirable results because
of an interpersonal unity the Supreme Court discredits as a medieval legal fiction.
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
180. KANMEYER, supra note 175 (footnotes omitted).
181. Id. Karmneyer provides a good sampling of the literature of the period.
Kammeyer posed the question: Should the nuclear family and traditional marriage
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that by the late 1970s there was widespread debate about whether
the nuclear family and marriage should be preserved or actively dis-
couraged. There is a direct link between the structure-function and
"Happiness" theories and the Supreme Court's decision in Trammel.
Both theories had found their way into the legal literature at an
early date. In 1929, Robert M. Hutchins and Donald Slesinger
wrote an article for the Minnesota Law Review entitled: Some Ob-
servations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations.182 They based
their observations on assumptions about the role of family in Eng-
land during the formative period of the law of evidence. In their
view, the nuclear family existed despite the unhappiness caused. It
evolved and survived only because of economic necessity. 83 By the
twentieth century the methods of production had changed, and the
family structure followed suit. The possibility of economic indepen-
dence outside the home liberated women and children from the
need to stay in the family."8
What we are witnessing, then, seems to be a period of social
flux in which the family is changing correlatively with indus-
trial change. There is still a strong desire for marital harmony;
in fact, the divorce rate may indicate that real harmony has
become the paramount issue, now that economic pressure has
been removed. Another possible item of evidence for the
stress on marital harmony may be the slight correlation be-
be preserved? His book included two essays suggesting the answer is yes and two
others taking the opposite view. Significantly, there are seven essays suggesting six
alternatives to the absolute nuclear marriage. The author of each proposed a differ-
ent alternative as a suitable substitution. The essays are: Nena O'Neill & George
O'Neill, Open Marriage (excerpt from NENA O'NEIL & GEOROE O'NEILL, OPEN
MARRIAGE: A NEw LIFE STYLE FOR COUPLES (1972)); Warren Mintz, Review of
Open Marriage (reprinted from Vol. 2, No. 2 SOCIETY (Jan. 1974)); Jesse Bernard,
Women, Marriage, and the Future (reprinted from THE FUTruRIsT); Bradford
Klevansky, Non-Utopian Communities-The Middle-Class Commune; Janis Kelly,
Sister Love: An Exploration of the Need for Homosexual Experience (reprinted from
21 THE FAMILy COORDINATOR: J. OF EDUC., COUNSELING AND SERVICES (Oct.
1972)); Victor Kassel, Polygyny After 60 (reprinted from Vol. 21, No. 4 GERIATRICS
214-18). Kammeyer concludes that controversies about marriage and the family
"have their origins in the ever present tension between social order and individual
freedom. Furthermore, there is a movement toward greater individual freedom be-
cause the exigencies of life ... are less than they once were." KAMmsYER, supra
note 175, at 5.
See also CASLER, supra note 176, at 131 ("The nuclear family... may be, by its
very nature, an inadequate locus of child-rearing. Even the best of parents is un-
likely to be good enough to counteract the obstacles to growth and maturity that are
embedded in this system." Further, "[flamily-reared children probably do less well
than they would if they were brought up in truly adequate institutions.").
182. 13 Mnm. L. Rnv. 675 (1929).
183. "[D]isharmony was prevented by economic necessity and social pressure. It
was important to keep the family together because it was a producing unit, and
economic disaster might very well follow a breakup." Id. at 677 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. at 677-78.
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tween low birth rate and high marriage rate. At the outset
even children seem to be sacrificed to the spousal relationship.
.. All the social and economic forces of society then are
acting centrifugally, tending to break up the old family rela-
tionship. The only remaining binding ties are sexual and affec-
tional. This realignment of forces makes a new family
adjustment inevitable.185
Fifty years later, the Court cited the Hutchins and Slesinger article
as an example of the sharp criticism of the marital privileges by legal
scholars.186
I have noted above the Trammel Court's warning to itself that it
should tread with care because families and marriage had already
suffered "much erosion." That sentence was the Court's only overt
acknowledgement that either may be worth preserving. The choice
of words is interesting. Erosion is a natural, unavoidable, and irre-
versible process. The metaphor fits exactly with the structure-func-
tion theory of the family, as does the Court's next sentence: "At the
same time, we cannot escape the reality that the law on occasion
adheres to doctrinal concepts long after the reasons which gave
them birth have disappeared and after experience suggests the need
for change.""
The Court also appears to have been influenced by the "Happi-
ness" theory. The Court's apparent acceptance of personal happi-
ness as the prime function of marriage is implicit in the Court's
argument that the social interest in preserving families and mar-
riages should not be achieved at the risk of personal cost to the wit-
ness spouse.ls I shall examine the merits of this argument below.189
Earlier I discussed the improbability that the contrast between the
Hawkins"9° and Trammel decisions resulted from societal shifts in
the sexual roles and other gender issues. It does appear, however,
that the difference can be traced to a significant erosion in the per-
ceived social value of marriage and the family during the interven-
ing two decades.
2. New Voices on the Wind
Timing is everything. The turmoil in and about marriage and the
family did not subside during the 1980s. Growing concern fueled a
continuing debate. Recently, even President Clinton and former
Vice President Quayle have found common ground on the need to
preserve the family. Family and marriage have become national
185. Id. at 678-79 (footnotes omitted).
186. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 n.4 (1980).
187. Id. at 48.
188. 1& at 52-53.
189. See discussion infra Part IV. E.
190. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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political issues. In the decade and a half since the Supreme Court's
decision in Trammel, a national policy on family and marriage has
emerged. The broad outline of this emerging policy suggests the
Court undervalued both institutions.
Nelson marked the presidential campaign of Jimmy Carter as the
entre point of family issues as a matter of national political de-
bate.19' President Carter attempted to create a unified national pol-
icy on the family. He failed for three reasons: (1) "the resistance
against new bureaucracy .... (2) the professional and political belief
in acknowledging the 'diversity and pluralism of families' ... , and
(3) resistance to the idea of comprehensive national policy as a use-
ful political strategy."'"
Since 1980 Congress has shown an increasing willingness to inter-
vene in family matters.' 93 In December 1987 the President and
Congress jointly established the National Commission on Children.
The Commission "was to assess the status of children and families in
the United States and propose new directions for policy and pro-
gram development. [Its] mission was to design an action agenda for
the 1990s and to build the necessary public commitment and sense
of common purpose to see it implemented." 94
On May 1, 1991, the National Commission on Children published
its final report: Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Chil-
dren and Families. The Commission's final report represents a ma-
jor shift in the wind last tested by the Supreme Court in Trammel.
[I]n recent years many policy makers and analysts-includ-
ing those who traditionally approach these matters from dif-
ferent intellectual and political perspectives-have called for a
new and more systematic approach to supporting the nation's
children and families.... On both sides of the political aisle
and in communities nationwide, the National Commission on
Children has seen a growing commitment to addressing chil-
dren's needs in the context of strong stable families.
Continued failure to embrace a national ethos that supports
children and values their families is short-sighted, self-destruc-
tive, and morally defeating. It will impoverish this nation cul-
turally, politically, and economically .... Accordingly, the
Commission urges the nation to begin today... to rekindle a
commitment to strong families and supportive communities
for children.
... America's future is forecast in the lives of its children
and the ability of their families to raise them. Most U.S. chil-
dren are healthy, happy, and secure ....
191. Barbara J. Nelson, Family Politics and Policy in the United States and West-
ern Europe, COMP. POL., April 1985 at 351, 362.
192. Id. at 363 (citation omitted).
193. See THE NATIONAL COMMSSION ON CILDREN, supra note 30.
194. Id. at viii.
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But at every age, among all races and income groups, and in
communities nationwide, many children are in jeopardy. They
grow up in families whose lives are in turmoil. Their parents
are [unable) to provide the nurturing, structure, and security
that protect children and prepare them for adulthood. 195
The Commission notes that most children in distress are not mem-
bers of a traditional nuclear family. 196
The Commission reviewed the changes in family patterns over the
last three decades. 1 7 Acknowledging the absence of consensus
among scholars and the public about the long-term effects of these
changes, the Commission concludes there is clear evidence children
"are worse off in 1990 than they were in 1970."198 "Americans from
all walks of life, whether they are raising children or not, believe
that something is terribly amiss with children and families."'" The
Commission concludes these circumstances are likely to continue
for the foreseeable future.200 The Commission also noted a consen-
sus that the root problem was the increased fragility of the family as
a social institution.
The condition of children's lives and their future prospects
largely reflect the well-being of their families. When families
are strong, stable, and loving, children have a sound basis for
becoming caring and competent adults .... Many of the na-
tion's gravest social problems are rooted in damaged
families.201
The National Commission on Children found that the "over-
whelming majority" of Americans acknowledge the importance of
marriage and the traditional family. Most Americans want to
195. Id. at 62-63 (footnote omitted).
196. Id. at 4 (One in four children are raised by one parent. Most of these "grow
up without the consistent presence of a father ... ." One in five lives in a family
below the poverty level. Approximately 500,000 children are born each year to
"teenage girls.").
197. Id. Its findings included the following trends: (1) less children per family,
i& at 16; (2) more single parent families (in 1970 approximately 12% of all house-
holds with children had a single parent in residence, by 1989 this number had risen
to 25%), id. at 17-18; (3) an increase in real terms of the families' income per child
(due, in part, to the smaller number of children per family), id. at 23; (4) an increase
in the number of children living below the poverty line (although the average child
has economic advantages not available to her parents, [olne in five lives ... below
the federal poverty level One in four.., under the age of three is poor."). This is
especially true for children living with their mothers in single parent families, Id. at
24; (5) a decline in the amount of time spent with children in two parent families
(primarily because both parents work outside the home in more two parent homes),
id at 27; (6) "[child] care by adults outside their immediate family is becoming an
increasingly common aspect of everyday life," id.
198. Id. at 28.
199. Id. at 11.
200. Id. at 37.
201. Id at 249.
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marry. Yet one in four children born in the United States is born to
an unmarried mother. As recently as 1960, the rate was only one in
twenty."° The Commission argues the need for all sectors of soci-
ety to "fashion responses that support and strengthen families as the
once and future domain for raising children."' 03 In the Commis-
sion's view, the federal government must take an active role.
Strong stable families are largely the product of social
forces, and they are amenable to social action .... The na-
tion's laws and public policies should reflect sound family val-
ues and should be aimed at strengthening and supporting
families in their childrearing roles .2r
The Commission coupled specific findings with articulation of
policy.
The family is and should remain society's primary institution
for bringing children into the world and for supporting their
growth and development throughout childhood.
The family is the basic social unit of our culture, and society
suffers when families are weak and ineffectual. America
needs a renewed commitment to the family, one that is based
on recognition of the changes that have taken place in individ-
ual lives, in families, and in the communities in which they live
.... A renewed commitment to children and families-to
marriage, parenthood, and childhood-must be a reaffirma-
tion of the ideal of the family and a commitment to family
relations that best support and nurture children in a rapidly
changing world.
Any effort to improve the lives and prospects of American
children must support and strengthen their families.
205
202. Id. at 252. The increase in births to unmarried women occurred at a time
when effective birth control and legal abortions were increasingly available, The
Commission found a variety of explanations by scholars for the increased number of
births to single women. They included: decreased economic opportunities available
to the fathers, social acceptance of early and premarital sex, and a perception among
poor young women of child bearing as one of the few opportunities for personal
success. The Commission also noted that the welfare system and federal tax laws
provided a disincentive to marry, especially to the poor. Similar disincentives were
found in typical requirements of the work place. Whether resulting from divorce or
birth outside of marriage, there is no dispute over the human and social costs of
single parent families. These include a marked increase in the prospect that the
children will experience poverty, emotional and behavioral problems, educational
failures, substance abuse, mental illness, and suicide. The sons of single parent fami-
lies are more vulnerable to many of the emotional and psychological risks than their
sisters. The daughters in single parent families are significantly more likely to expe-
rience teenage pregnancy than are their peers in two parent families. They are,
therefore, more likely to become the head of a new generation of single parent fami-
lies. Id. at 252-54.
203. Id at 37.
204. Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at 68 (italics in original, denoting a "Principle for Action").
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When next the United States Supreme Court considers marital
privileges it will find the political vacuum of 1980 filled. It will hear
a chorus of voices reaffirming the future of family and marriage as
the warp and weft of our cultural fabric.
As America enters the 1990s, common ground for a national
policy for children and families is emerging. The family is and
should remain the fundamental institution for bringing chil-
dren into the world and for supporting their growth and devel-
opment throughout childhood. Children's well-being must be
a primary focus of families, and families must be at the center
of social policies and national priorities. 0 6
E. Effect on Marriage Privilege
The Trammel Court concluded the change it was making "furthers
the important public interest in marital harmony without unduly
burdening legitimate law enforcement needs."'  Maybe. But, the
Court's arguments are less than compelling. In preceding sections
of this Article, I have suggested the improbability of the Trammel
opinion resulting in significant social benefits. There is no reason to
suppose federal courts have a greater need for spousal evidence to-
day than in the past. Nor is there any reason to hope that handing
law enforcement a new weapon will materially advance the war on
crime. It is equally clear that there is no empirical evidence sug-
gesting the Trammel decision has wrought substantial injury to the
social fabric. This lack of evidence does not mean, however, that the
Court was correct in concluding that the ruling would have no
effect 08
The Court advances two arguments supporting the conclusion
that no damage was done to marriage or family by its ruling. First,
the Court suggests the change will not damage any marriage worth
saving. "When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a
criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship
is almost certainly in disrepair;, there is probably little in the way of
206. Id. at 76.
207. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 53.
208. For an oft quoted argument not used by the Court in Trammel, see Robert
M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Fan.
ily Relations, 13 MINN. L. RP.v. 675 (1929). "[Plractically no one outside the legal
profession knows anything about the rules regarding privileged communications be-
tween spouses. As far as the writers are aware (though research might lead to an-
other conclusion) marital harmony among lawyers who know about privileged
communications is not vastly superior to that of other professional groups." Id at
682. The argument is appealing but facetious. It is equally likely that only lawyers
are aware of limitations upon the privileges. Therefore, they are incapable of en-
joying the intended benefit. Both the argument and my counter are based on an
assumption that lawyers conduct their personal lives in a professional manner. If
this assumption were true, all lawyers would have current wills and read all contracts
before signing them.
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marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." 2 9 It is difficult to
take this argument seriously. Prison is a fearsome prospect. Is the
Court suggesting a willingness to endure years in prison rather than
jeopardize a spouse as the minimum standard of "marital harmony"
worth saving? If so, things are worse than even the National Com-
mission on Children suspected. The number of marriages worth
preserving must be small indeed.210 Even assuming this is a valid
test of marital harmony, the argument is flawed on other levels.
The privilege is based on a policy to preserve marriages.211 The
effect of Trammel is to create the forensic equivalent of a destructive
testing process. At a minimum, the policy would suggest refraining
from overt acts intended to destroy marriages.
The practical effect of the decision is demonstrated by the case of
United States v. Long.212 Mr. Long was a union official accused of
violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) and assorted other offenses. 213 Mr. Long's wife entered
into an agreement with the government in which she agreed to tes-
tify against her husband and others in exchange for personal immu-
nity from prosecution. At trial, Mrs. Long's "brief substantive
testimony related to the ... extortion charge and the false income
tax filing charges." '14 The jury was also informed that she had been
granted immunity.215
During closing arguments, Mr. Long's lawyer reminded the jury
that the government had given Mrs. Long immunity. Counsel told
the jury: "[I]f she didn't testify she'd be subject to prosecution
"... ,216 The trial judge interrupted defense counsel and told the
jury to ignore counsel's remark. The following morning, the court
gave the following instruction to the jury:
During [Long's counsel's] summation he stated that Ms.
Olga Long was subpoenaed. As you have heard during the
trial, Olga and John Long are married and as a result of that
relationship Olga Long could not and was not subpoenaed by
the government at any time.
Mrs. Long could not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band and had the absolute right to refuse to testify. Mrs. Long
209. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 52.
210. Such things do happen. The Author is aware of anecdotal evidence of per-
sons offering to plead guilty on condition that their spouse not be prosecuted. I am
also aware of occasions when law enforcement used the threat of prosecuting the
spouse as an inducement to obtain cooperation.
211. Even assuming the appropriateness of weighing the value of each marriage
before determining whether it merits protection of the privilege, such a process must
look to the marriage as it exists before the privilege is applied, not after.
212. 917 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1990).
213. Id. at 693.
214. Id at 699.
215. ld.
216. Id.
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chose to testify, appeared voluntarily and waived the marital
privilege? 7
Mr. Long was convicted. On appeal he argued that the trial court's
instruction was reversible error. The Second Circuit agreed. "The
instruction... suggested that [she] was ready and willing to testify
against her husband when, in fac4 she was effectively compelled to
do so to avoid prosecution ... ."218
The Supreme Court's decision in Trammel sanctions government
use of compulsion to shatter marriages in pursuit of convictions.
The Court washed its hands of any responsibility for achieving an
appropriate balance between the competing social policies. Indeed
it washed all judicial hands of any involvement. The issue is now
decided in the privacy of the interrogation room long before the
case comes to court.
The Court's approach is not without precedent. This is not the
first time courts have allowed the sovereign to test individual will.
The change from trial by ordeal to trial by jury was not greeted with
universal joy. Many accused continued to have greater trust in di-
vine intervention than in a jury composed of their neighbors.
Hitherto [the defendant] has been able to invoke the judg-
ment of God, and can we now deprive him of this ancient, this
natural right? ... No, no one can be tried by jury who does
not consent to be so tried. But what we can do is this-we can
compel him to give his consent, we can starve him into giving
his consent, and, again, we can quicken the slow action of star-
vation by laying him out naked on the floor of the dungeon
and heaping weights upon his chest until he says that he will
abide by the verdict of his fellows. And so we are brought to
the pedantic cruelty of the peine forte et dure.219
The conditions of imprisonment may have changed, but the threat
of imprisonment remains the courts' compulsion of choice 20 The
inappropriateness of this approach is also apparent if we imagine it
217. Id.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. FREDERIc W. MArrLAND & FRANcis C. MoNrAGuE, A SKnTic OF ENG-
LUSH LEGAL HISTORY 60 (AMS Press reprint 1978) (James F. Colby ed. 1915).
220. Contrast these non-coercive attempts to induce testimony with those used in
an attempt to compel John Lilburn to incriminate himself. 8 JOHN H. WiMoRE,
EvmiDENc § 2250, at 282-83 (McNaughton rev. 1961). John Lilburn, "an obstreper-
ous and forward opponent of the Stuarts" was tried for treason. Id. The Lilbum
trial is reported at 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1635-47). Initially, Lilburn refused to answer
any questions except those pertaining to the charge on which he had been indicted.
Eventually he refused to answer any questions at all. He claimed he could not be
compelled to incriminate himself. He was whipped and pilloried for his refusal.
When Parliament was finally called after an eleven-year recess, John Lilburn was
there on opening day with a petition for redress. Eight years and a second petition
later, a bill declaring the sentence illegal passed the House of Lords and he was
granted 3000 pounds as reparations. Id.
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being applied to other privileges. For example, imagine a lawyer
unfortunate enough to be caught cheating on her income tax. The
government is willing to offer immunity if she will testify against her
client. The trial judge permits the lawyer's testimony over the cli-
ent's objection. The Supreme Court affirms, holding that permitting
the lawyer to waive the privilege will further "the important public
interest" in the attorney/client relationship." The Court reasons
that, if the lawyer is willing to testify against the client "-whatever
the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair;
there is probably little ... for the privilege to preserve. ,222
Finally, if this process of destructive testing were an appropriate
approach, we could do better by dispensing with the privilege alto-
gether. If the marriage is worth preserving, the witness spouse will
refuse to testify and endure imprisonment for contempt or commit
perjury.
The Court follows this argument with a second point that is
equally revealing.
[A] rule of evidence that permits an accused to prevent ad-
verse spousal testimony seems far more likely to frustrate jus-
tice than to foster family peace. It is argued that abolishing
the privilege will permit the Government to come between
husband and wife, pitting one against the other. That, too,
misses the mark. Neither Hawkins, nor any other privilege,
prevents the Government from enlisting one spouse to give
information concerning the other or to aid in the other's ap-
prehension. It is only the spouse's testimony in the courtroom
that is prohibited.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that vesting the privilege
in the accused could actually undermine the marital relation-
ship. For example, in a case such as this, the Government is
unlikely to offer a wife immunity and lenient treatment if it
knows that her husband can prevent her from giving adverse
testimony. 2 3
The footnote suggests that the privilege is ineffective because the
Government will exploit its power to pit one spouse against the
other simply for information even if it cannot use one spouse as a
witness against the other. The next sentence in the text suggests the
opposite-that the government will not use its power unless it can
call the spouse as a witness. In fact both are true. Ordinarily the
prosecution will offer immunity merely for information only in the
exceptional case. Such an offer is likely only if the crime of one
spouse is less heinous than that of the other and the perceived need
for information is great. Ironically, this circumstance is tantamount
221. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 53.
222. 1& at 52.
223. Id. at 52-53.
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to a pragmatic mechanism for ensuring that the government would
attempt to compel cooperation only in cases of extreme need.
The Court concluded that the effect of the common law privilege
was to permit one spouse "to escape justice at the expense of the
other." This is undeniably true but hardly a distinguishing crite-
rion. After all, escaping justice is exactly what the government per-
suaded Mrs. Trammel to do, at considerable expense to Mr.
Trammel.
I have discussed both of the arguments advanced by the Court
justifying its conclusion that the change imposed by the Trammel
decision "furthers the important public interest in marital har-
mony." Both arguments focus on the viability of the particular
marriage and balance it against law enforcement's generic need for
evidence.2' At a minimum, if the focus is upon the particular mar-
riage, why not also inquire into the need for the particular evidence
that the spouse might provide? This is a false trail. The purpose of
evidentiary privileges is not to test the relative merit of individual
relationships. The purpose of the Spouses' Testimonial Privilege,
like all privileges, is to strike a societal balance. Evidentiary privi-
leges are not rules of forensic minutiae. They are not intended to
determine if this person is guilty or if that marriage is worth preserv-
ing. Privileges are the broad societal limitations upon the judicial
process.
V. CONCLUSION
There are some conclusions we can reach with a fair degree of
certainty about the Supreme Court's decision in Trammel v. United
States. 27 First, undoubtedly a few defendants were convicted who
would otherwise have been acquitted during the last fifteen years.
Second, a few marriages have been destroyed that might otherwise
have survived. It is equally certain both will continue to happen
from time to time in the future.
Unfortunately, we run past the limits of our certainty before we
reach the important questions. The outcome of a single case or sur-
vival of a particular marriage are not what the evidentiary privilege
is about. The Spouses' Testimonial Privilege is about the impor-
tance of family and marriage. It is about the need for evidence and
limits upon the societal costs of obtaining evidence. It is about the
need for privacy, trust, and loyalty. It is about governmental power
to compel individuals to do what they otherwise would not.
224. Id. at 53.
225. Id
226. Steven N. Gofman, "Honey, The Judge Says We're History":" Abrogating the
Marital Privileges Via Modem Doctrines of Marital Worthiness, 77 CoRNEa. L REv.
843, 860-65 (1992).
227. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
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Fifteen years ago the Trammel Court decided that the societal in-
terest in assisting law enforcement was more important than pre-
serving marriage from further erosion. Today, there are voices
suggesting a different conclusion.
[A] growing body of research suggests there are several identi-
fiable characteristics of strong families. Among the most im-
portant of these is clear, open, and frequent communication
among family members.2' Similarly, strong families cultivate
a sense of belonging to a warm, cohesive social unit, while at
the same time nurturing the development of individual
strengths and interests. In successful families, members pro-
vide one another mutual support, recognition, and respect,
and they are willing to make sacrifices if necessary to preserve
the well-being of the family.22
9
Will it matter to our great-grandchildren that Mr. Trammel went
to prison and Mrs. Trammel did not? Undoubtedly not. But, it
might matter that the United States Supreme Court felt that convic-
tions were more important than marriages.
It does matter where we choose to look for our future. Where we
choose to place the wager of our hope matters a great deal. Do we
bet on the squad room, the courtroom, or our living room? Which
we choose has more to do with who we are and who we shall be-
come, than anything we shall ever win or lose on the wager itself.
228. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHIMDREN, supra note 30, at 254; NicK
STINNmr & JOHN DEFRAIN, SECRETS OF STRONG FAMILIES 14 (1985). See also
JERRY M. LEWIS, How's YOUR FAMILY? A GUIDE TO IDENTIFYING YOUR FAM.
IY'S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (1979); N.B. Epstein et al., The McMaster Fam-
ily Assessment Device, J. OF MARITAL & FAm. THERAPY 9, 171-80 (1983); The
Diversity and Strength of American Families: Hearing Before the Select Committee on
Children, Youth, and Families of the House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
100-06 (1986) (statement of David Olson).
229. Id. at 44-50 (statement of Nick Stinnett).
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